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Main Focus and Relevance 
 
 
The main topic examined in the present research is the outcome of the 2015-2016 period that has 
been described as the “European migrant crisis”, which has dominated all formats of socio-
political discourse in the European Union since its very beginning. The origins of this situation 
can be traced back to 2011 and the events which have become known under the name “Arab 
Spring,” when a series of demonstrations against political regimes occurred in the Middle East. 
One of these countries was Syria, where the aforementioned circumstances provoked a major 
civil war, resulting in the subsequent military involvement of foreign powers – such as the 
United States and Russia, and subsequently caused a wave of refugees towards neighbouring 
countries and Europe. According to official data, in 2015 and 2016 over 1,4 million refugees and 
migrants reached Europe, predominantly arriving from conflict-ridden countries – the Syrian 
Arab Republic, Afghanistan and Iraq.1 This migration wave was the biggest Europe had seen 
since World War II and it was decidedly unprepared to face the resulting situation.  
 
Nowadays – five years since the “crisis” started, EU Member States and collective institutions 
are still struggling to deal with the issue of migration and it remains as one of the central topics 
in the European socio-political discourse. In recent years, several policies have been undertaken 
to improve the situation while upholding European values, but at the same time migration has 
become a point of disagreement between EU Member States and a major proponent of a populist 
wave, led by a securitisation rhetoric. This research will therefore examine the effects of the 
crisis on European policies and political discourse in the context of securitisation. More 
specifically, the overemphasis of European Union’s main political actors and institutions in the 
discourse will be looked into, as well as the dominant role it plays in the formation of public 




1 Europe - Refugee and Migrant arrivals summary data // Operational Portal: Refugee Situations. United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2019. 
 5 
Firstly, for the purpose of the research it is necessary to point out the distinction between the 
three widely used terms “migrant,” “refugee” and “asylum-seeker.” The difference between 
them is important, as it does not only define the official status of the people arriving in the 
European Union, but oftentimes directly affects the attitudes of politicians, media and individual 
citizens towards them. All three of the aforementioned terms are used for people who have fled 
their country of residence for various reasons and have crossed international borders seeking to 
settle someplace else. The most widely used term is “migrant,” which does not have an official 
international legal definition and is often applied as an umbrella term by different stakeholders. 
Thus, the wide use of this term may often include refugees and asylum seekers as well, as part of 
“mixed migration” – movements of people who cross international borders for different reasons. 
Traditionally, a migrant is someone who is moving outside their country of origin by choice, as 
opposed to forcefully, in order to reconnect with family or in search of a better life, among other 
reasons. A refugee is defined as “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country 
of origin, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion”.2 Whereas an asylum-
seeker is someone who is seeking international protection under the 1951 UN Convention and 
has yet to be legally recognised as a refugee because they’re waiting for their asylum claim to be 
processed. UNHCR suggests that due to the necessity of the individuals belonging to the groups 
of refugees and asylum-seekers to receive international protection, that the use of the umbrella 
term “migrant” should be conducted carefully. Furthermore, the distinction between refugees 
and asylum-seekers on the one hand and economic migrants on the other hand is important for 
the perception of the persons holding the aforementioned statuses. For instance, many Europeans 
seem to be more accepting of refugees as persons fleeing life-threatening conditions than 
economic migrants, who are perceived to have a choice in whether to move out of their country. 
Nonetheless, the so-called European “migrant crisis” is often presented in a way that does not 
offer clear distinctions between the people entering the EU and they appear to represent a 
holistic concern for the political and public opinion. 
 
Indeed, the issue of immigration has risen to the top of European concerns in recent years and 
has overtaken economic themes, which persistently topped the charts of the most important 
 
2 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees // United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). – 2010. Article 1(A)(2). – P. 14. 
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issues for Europeans after the 2007-08 world financial crisis. Latest data indicates that 
immigration is still the number one concern for European citizens, with 34% claiming it’s the 
most important issue facing the EU at the moment.3 Consequently, since the very beginning of 
the migration crisis, the security frame has been among the most widespread and arguably the 
one holding the most power to affect the public opinion.  
 
In recent years, right-wing and populist parties across Europe have used the migration issue as an 
opportunity for greater public exposure and a means to receive more votes, with many 
succeeding in this endeavour. Most notable examples to mention could be AfD (Alternative für 
Deutschland), which is now the biggest opposition party in Germany, the League party in Italy, 
with its leader Matteo Salvini becoming a key figure in nationalist movements in Europe, the rise 
of the Vox party in Spain, the Greek Solution and Golden Dawn parties in Greece, as well as 
Viktor Orban’s government in Hungary. These represent just some of the examples of a rising 
nationalist wave in Europe, fuelled primarily by their anti-immigration rhetoric. Indeed, in the 
recent European parliament elections, one in three respondents claimed that their primary reason 
for voting was the issue of immigration.4 The right-wing and nationalist parties also gained a 
significant number of seats in the European parliament after the latest elections of May 2019, 
attempting to increase their influence in Brussels. Soon after, a far-right political group – 
“Identity and Democracy,” was formed within the parliament with nine nationalist European 
parties as members, including the German AfD and the Italian League. The group overall holds 
73 seats in the total of 751, which still does not account for the seats occupied by other 
nationalist parties belonging to another right-wing coalition formed within the parliament – the 
“European Conservatives and Reformists Group,” as well as parties which were not attached to 
any coalition after the election – such as the Greek far-right party Golden Dawn, which won 2 
seats in the European parliament. Overall, the two conservative groups currently hold a total of 
135 seats in the parliament, in addition to the 51 seats held by the Non-attached members, which 
are predominantly composed of nationalist and far-right parties.5 This means that approximately 
 
3 Public Opinion in the European Union: Standard Eurobarometer 92 of November, 2019 // European Commission, 
2019. – P. 15. 
4 The 2019 Post-Electoral Survey: Have European Elections Entered a New Dimension? // Eurobarometer Survey 
91.5 of the European Parliament: A Public Opinion Monitoring Study. European Parliament, 2019. – P. 51. 
5 2019 European election results [Electronic resource] // European Parliament. URL: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en (accessed: 27.03.2020) 
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one fourth of the European parliament is currently in favour of nationalist and anti-immigration 
policies, despite the fact that the numbers of arriving migrants and refugees have radically 
dropped since 2016.  
 
Given this situation, migration does still represent a topic of urgency for the European Union and 
dominates the socio-political discourse. This was also comprehensively reflected by Stefan 
Lehne in 2018, indicating that the EU was still in shock mode despite the height of the crisis in 
numbers being in the past – “The EU received 43 percent fewer asylum applications in 2017 than 
it did in 2016. The mass reception centres have mostly emptied, and the school gyms and army 
barracks have reverted to their original functions. But while the acute crisis has ended, the 
situation has hardly normalised. The 2018 Italian elections demonstrate that concerns 
surrounding migration and asylum continue to dominate the public space and shape national and 
EU politics. Border controls at several internal Schengen borders are still in place, and migration 
remains the top concern of EU citizens.”.6 
 
The motivation behind the research was thus an intention to examine how the recent discourse 
around the migrant crisis in the European Union has been shaping and influencing agendas of 
EU political institutions in a security context. While a lot of past research focused on the crisis 
itself and the subsequent “shock” the European Union faced due to the unprecedented numbers 
of arriving migrants and refugees, this research paper focuses primarily on the period after the 
crisis that took place in 2015-2016, with a deeper examination of the developments in the past 
five years. Latest data indicates that numbers of migrants and refugees who arrive in Europe 
have significantly dropped since 2016, with total arrivals decreasing from 1,032,408 in 2015, to 
373,652 in 2016, and 185,139 in 2017.7 These statistics might lead to the false impression that 
the worst is over and the current numbers present a manageable task for Member States and 
European institutions. In fact, in March 2019 the European Commission released a factsheet 
debunking “myths” about migration, where it was stated that the EU was no longer in crisis 
 
6 Lehne, S. The EU Remains Unprepared for the Next Migration Crisis [Electronic resource] / S. Lehne // Carnegie 
Europe. URL: https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/04/03/eu-remains-unprepared-for-next-migration-crisis-pub-75965 
(accessed: 13.04.2020) 
7 Europe - Refugee and Migrant arrivals summary data // Operational Portal: Refugee Situations. United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2019. 
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mode.8 Nonetheless, that is not precisely the truth. Firstly, the numbers of arrivals have not 
decreased significantly since 2017, with the arrivals in 2019 numbering 125,472.9 Secondly, the 
EU is still struggling with the implementation of a common immigration and asylum policy, 
which has led to major divisions within European institutions, as well as procedural delays due 
to ineffectiveness and high level of bureaucracy. It is thus necessary to point out that the 
relevance of the crisis is not only measured in numbers of the arriving refugees and migrants, but 
in the effectiveness and intensity of policies undertaken in order to face the issue, as well as the 
socio-political context in which it is being presented across Europe. The primary role in these 
conditions is occupied by the main EU institutions, which hold the sole decision-making power 
with regards to collective policies of the European Union and which are obligatory for the EU 
Member States. 
 
A major turning point in the migrant crisis was the 2016 agreement between European Union 
and Turkey, which aimed at decreasing irregular migration in Europe. Indeed, for the years 2015 
and 2016, numbers of arriving migrants and refugees reached all-time highs with over one 
million arrivals. The vast majority of the arriving people were refugees from the Syrian Arab 
Republic, while the rest came from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Africa, among others. Many of 
them had to turn to criminal networks of smugglers for assistance in their transportation and 
knowingly faced a dangerous trip through the Mediterranean to reach the Greek shores.  
 
After the application of the EU-Turkey deal, the numbers of arrivals decreased significantly. 
According to the agreement reached between the European and Turkish governments, the failed 
asylum seekers that entered Europe through Greece would be taken back to Turkey in exchange 
for a large amount of money that was given to Turkey by the EU in order to accept these people. 
However, this meant that only individuals registered to have entered Europe through the Greek 
islands would qualify to participate in this refugee exchange programme. Consequently, the 
Greek islands essentially turned into major reception centres, where people would have to wait 
for long periods of time for their asylum applications to be processed to find out whether they 
could enter the Greek mainland and then, potentially, other EU member states, or to be taken 
 
8 Facts matter: Debunking myths about migration // European Commission, 2019.  
9 Europe - Refugee and Migrant arrivals summary data // Operational Portal: Refugee Situations. United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2019. 
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back to Turkey as failed asylum seekers not qualifying for refugee status. In addition, as seen in 
the below graph (Figure 1), arrivals to Greece have in fact increased since 2018 – further 





Figure 1 – Monthly Arrivals in Greece in 2018-2020 (By Sea and Land) 
Source: UNHCR 
 
As a result, due to extremely slow procedures and ineffective bureaucracy, refugee camps on 
Greek islands such as Lesvos and Samos have been painfully overcrowded, with people having 
to exist in unacceptable living conditions. This has created tensions between the Greek 
government, Greek island citizens and the EU, as the latter is blamed for not offering sufficient 
help to deal with the new continuing arrivals to the already overcrowded reception centres. 
Those who are successfully granted asylum have to be accepted by various EU countries 
according to certain quotas, in order to ease the burden on “first contact” states such as Greece or 
Italy. But this process has been met with many issues and delays, with countries like Slovakia 
 10 
and Hungary illegally refusing to take in refugees.10 Furthermore, this specific case underscores 
the main issue facing the European Union in terms of facing the migration crisis – absence of 
efficient institutional policies at the highest level, which could manage to be both efficient and 
correspond with the EU’s human rights obligations. The Greek situation is thus one of the signs 
that the migrant crisis in Europe is far from over and shall continue to dominate the socio-
political discourse in the upcoming years. 
 
 
Aim and Objectives 
 
 
Consequently, the aim of the present research is to reveal whether the official immigration 
policies of the EU have been securitised and if they correspond with EU values and human rights 
obligations. 
 
In order to achieve this aim, the following objectives have been set:  
 
- The outcome of the 2015-2016 European migrant crisis will be evaluated through the use 
of securitisation theory 
- Quantitative and qualitative analysis tools will be applied to conduct content and 
discourse analysis 
- The relation between the discourse and official policies will be established 
- The correspondence of EU human rights obligations and official immigration policies 
will be evaluated 
 
 
Theory and Methodology 
 
 
The theory through which the main theme of the research shall be examined is Copenhagen 
School’s “securitisation” theory – a term introduced by Ole Wæver in the mid-1990s in his work 
 
10 The Court dismisses the actions brought by Slovakia and Hungary against the provisional mechanism for the 
mandatory relocation of asylum seekers // Court of Justice of the European Union. – 2017. Press Release № 91/17. 
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“Securitisation and Desecuritisation”.11 Other influential figures in the formation of this theory 
were Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde, who along with Wæver wrote arguably the most 
significant contribution to the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework in security studies – 
“Security: A New Framework for Analysis,” published in 1997. Overall, the theory represents a 
combination of constructivism and classical political realism in its approach to the concept of 
security.  
 
With the appearance of securitisation theory, significant attention was paid for the first time to 
non-materialist aspects of security. In classical terms of state-military approach in security 
studies, security is largely defined in terms of military capabilities and actual distribution of 
power, whereas in the re-evaluation of securitisation theory, security as seen as a concept that 
can be constructed through a speech act – “It is by labelling something a security issue that it 
becomes one”.12 By extension, there are specific securitising actors – usually political elites, who 
claim that extraordinary measures can be taken whenever a specific object is being threatened. 
Consequently, said object or issue can be moved from the sphere of normal politics to 
emergency politics and the security realm, legitimising the undertaking of extraordinary 
measures. In that context, anything can become a security issue if a securitising actor 
successfully claims so and the process of securitisation itself is intersubjective, largely 
depending on the perception of the audience and the delivery of the actor. Therefore, an issue 
can become a security concern not simply because it represents objective threat, but rather 
because it is presented as such. Therefore, security is a speech act – “the word security is the act; 
the utterance is the primary reality,”13 through which issues can be socially constructed by actors 
as threats to security. In this case, securitising actors are those that “are placed in positions of 
power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security”.14 Based on this suggestion, 
securitising actors need to have an active role and legitimacy within the discourse, therefore 
 
11 Wæver, O. Securitization and Desecuritization / O. Wæver // On Security / ed.: R. Lipschutz. – New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995. – P. 46. 
12 Wæver, O. Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools in Security Theory and their Origins between Core 
and Periphery / O. Wæver // International Studies Association Conference (17–20 March, Montreal). / International 
Studies Association, 2004. – P. 13. 
13 Wæver, O. Securitization and Desecuritization. – P. 46. 
14 Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J. H. Security: A New Framework for Analysis / B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. H. de 
Wilde. – London: Boulder; Lynne Rienner, 1998. – P. 31. 
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political and security elites are more likely to occupy this position. At the same time, there can 
also be functional actors, who do not create their own constructions but rather disseminate and 
popularise the rhetoric of securitising actors. This is a position usually occupied by the various 
types of media.  
 
But it is not enough to examine the discourse alone and focus on language. The research would 
not be completed without examining the actual policies that were undertaken within the scope of 
securitisation of migration. Later additions to securitisation theory moved beyond the idea of the 
“speech act” and investigated practices and policies as well, in order to offer a more holistic 
view. Namely, the practice-oriented approach to the theory is represented by such scholars as 
Huysmans, Balzacq and Bigo of the Paris School. This direction of the theory underscores the 
importance of institutions and their policies as a means to evaluate the effects of the discourse – 
“to focus only on the role of political discourse in the securitisation process is to underestimate 
the bureaucratic professionalisation of the management of unease”.15 That is why the present 
research will examine both the language and the subsequent immigration policies of EU 
institutions in order to provide more effective analysis. 
 
For the specific case of migration, it is important to examine the role of collective identity and its 
role in the process of securitisation. According to the Copenhagen School, existential threats to 
collective identity could be internal or external developments that can be seen in negative terms 
as invasive and in positive terms as evolution of identity. But due to the fact that “identity” is 
predominantly viewed in conservative terms, it is rather easy to create the rhetoric of a challenge 
or threat to identity through an “us” versus “them” logic. This can create tales of danger that will 
unite communities against those on the outside, by underlining the differences between them. 
For instance, in ancient Greece, a similar concept was used to separate the Hellenic nation from 
everyone else who did not belong to it and was therefore part of the barbaric “them.” Despite 
Greek city-states not being united in one common Pan-Hellenic state and often fighting each 
other, their collective identity still united them against external threats, such as the Persians. 
Thus, the “holders of the collective identity” have significant influence and power due to the 
importance of maintaining and reproducing a language, a set of behavioural customs or a 
 
15 Bigo, D. Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease / D. Bigo // Alternatives. 
– 2002. Vol. 27: Special Issue. – P. 74. 
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conception of ethnic purity. Consequently, for the topic of migration the concepts of external 
threat and collective identity are centric in whether it will be securitised based on how close-
minded or open-minded the holders of said identity are.16 And the main method to determine the 
level of securitisation suggested by the Copenhagen School is discourse analysis, which pays a 
lot of attention to language and frames, since those are the main tools through which security is 
constructed. 
 
In the case of the 2015-16 European migrant crisis, securitisation was an evident development, 
which could be observed through institutional policies, political speeches and the media. The 
most common stereotypes around migrants and the perceived problems created by immigration 
were among the most popular in use – words such as “crime,” “security,” “threat,” becoming 
widespread in many socio-political discussions on migration. Consequently, the issue became an 
urgent one, demanding “extraordinary” measures, which were accepted as necessary by the 
majority of the public.  
 
Thus, the role of language is of major importance in the process of securitisation of migration. 
The methodology of this research will therefore include discourse analysis, conducted on official 
documents of EU institutes – laws, speeches, statements and press releases. This analysis will 
aim at pinpointing specific words pertaining to securitisation being present in the examined texts. 
The approach of the Copenhagen School which views the securitisation process as a “speech act” 
will be of primary significance at this stage. Further on, the approach of the Paris School, which 
expands on the discursive essence of securitisation theory by looking at the resulting policy 
aspect, will be applied to examine the immigration policies of EU institutions. Thus, the “quota” 
system, the EU-Turkey agreement and the role of Frontex will be looked into from the 
perspective of securitisation theory – firstly, by analysing the language of EU institutions, and 
secondly, by looking into the formulation of actual policies decided within the framework of 
these three research areas. 
 
However, the aforementioned type of qualitative methodology will be combined with a 
quantitative method, in order to offer a more comprehensive and clear picture of the situation. 
This part of the analysis will be based on Baele and Sterck’s proposed methodology, which takes 
 
16 Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J. H. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. – P. 23. 
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into account the repetitive nature of securitisation language – more specifically, they suggest that 
the “speech act” may occur with regularity, instead of as an isolated incident.17 Thusly, they 
create a relevant dictionary with words pertaining to securitsation and call it “security lexicon”. 
The composition of the lexicon is based on the security glossaries of the “UN Glossary of Terms 
and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies” and the Palgrave Handbook on Security Studies.18 
Next, they employ the text analysis software LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) in 
order to count the occurrence of the words in their security lexicon within a collection of 
pertinent documents. Afterwards, they apply statistical analysis in order to present their research 
results. Through this method, it is possible to include a large number of relevant texts pertaining 
both to discourse and policy practices and therefore receive a complete and unbiased illustration 
of the securitisation process and its intensity. The hypothesis at this stage is that the increased 
frequency of securitising language indicates the intended presence of a securitising move. This 
means that the ratio of words contained in the security lexicon over the total words in the texts 
represents the “security ratio” – and the higher it is, the higher is the level of securitisation. As a 
comparison, Baele and Sterck provide a sample of a “low” security ratio contained in generic 
texts and a sample of a “high” security sample ratio contained in hard security texts – these are 
then compared to the ratios encountered in the immigration policy texts.  
 
The same logic will be applied in the present research, through the use of a different software – 
the text analysis programme MEH (Meaning Extraction Helper), which will be used to measure 
word presence in the given relevant texts. The advantages of such a method are multiple: it 
provides a completely unbiased analysis with an entirely automated text review process; it can 
review a large number of texts, thus providing highly representative results; and the novelty of 
this method in securitisation theory analysis offers the opportunity for original findings in the 
researcher’s own areas of choice. In the present research, 50 different official documents of EU 
institutes centred around each of the three policy areas under analysis – the Quota system, the 
EU-Turkey agreement and the role of Frontex, will be reviewed against Baele and Sterck’s 
proposed security lexicon. Overall, 150 texts will be analysed and statistical analysis will be 
 
17 Baele, S. J. Sterck, O. C. Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A New Method for 
Stronger Empirical Claims / S. J. Baele, O. C. Sterck // Political Studies. – 2014. Vol. 63, №. 5. – P. 1125. 
18 Ibid. – P. 1127. 
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employed in order to present the results. Lastly, comparative analysis will be employed in order 
to compare levels of securitisation between the three examined fields.  
 
As the final step of the research, the aspect of human rights and how European immigration 
policies correspond with them will be examined. This concluding part will take into account 
official EU documents relevant to immigration policies, as well as criticism the EU has received 
from various academics and international organisations with regards to its human rights 
obligations in the handling of the migrant crisis. 
 
 
Literature and Sources Review 
 
 
The primary sources utilised in the present research are vastly composed of official documents of 
the European Union’s institutions, as well as other international organisations and non-
governmental organisations. This includes press releases, legal documents, speeches and 
statistical data available on the official websites of the EU institutions such as the European 
Commission19, European Council20 and Frontex21; United Nations22 and its relevant agencies and 
services, such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)23 and International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM)24; lastly, various NGOs primarily within the humanitarian and human rights 
sector, such as Amnesty International25 and Human Rights Watch26. These sources can be 
classified geographically – firstly, those sources that have been released and made accessible 
directly by EU institutions and official representatives and, secondly, those available from 
international organisations not bound by direct association with the European Union. 
 
 
19 Official website of the European Commission. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en  
20 Official website of the European Council. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/  
21 Official website of Frontex. URL: https://frontex.europa.eu/  
22 Official website of the UN. URL: https://www.un.org/en/  
23 Official website of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). URL: https://www.unhcr.org/  
24 Official website of International Organisation for Migration (IOM). URL: https://www.iom.int/  
25 Official website of Amnesty International. URL: https://www.amnesty.org/en/  
26 Official website of Human Rights Watch (HRW). URL: https://www.hrw.org/  
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Moreover, the literature applied in this research consists of previous works written by various 
scholars on the topic of migration in Europe. These predominantly consist of scholarly and 
online articles, books and conference papers. These secondary sources can be classified 
chronologically – dating back before 2015, which is marked as the beginning of the European 
migrant crisis, and those dated from 2015 and afterwards. While the former group reflects on the 
historical perspective of migration in Europe and the world, the latter includes information 
specific to the European migrant crisis itself and is more relevant to the present research. For 
instance, the works of scholars such as Benard27, Bonifazi28, Jennissen29, Naito30 and Czaika31 
can be included in the pre-2015 group, as their examination of European migration predates the 
events of the migrant crisis. Then, other notable examples such as the works of Jones et al.32, 
Lindgaard33, Nas34 and Pinos35 can be incorporated in the post-2015 group, since they speak of 
events and policies that occurred after the start of the crisis. 
 
Additionally, the literature also includes works of notable representatives of securitisation 
theory, as well as more specifically those focused on the securitisation of migration. These works 
 
27 Benard, C. Migrant Workers and European Democracy / C. Benard // Political Science Quarterly. – 1978. Vol. 93, 
№. 2. P. 277. 
28 Bonifazi, C. Evolution of regional patterns of international migration in Europe / C. Bonifazi // International 
Migration in Europe / ed.: C. Bonifazi, M. Okólski, J. Schoorl, P. Simon. – Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2008. – P. 109-119. 
29 Jennissen, R. Van Der Gaag, N. Van Wissen, L. Searching for similar international migration trends across 
countries in Europe / R. Jennissen, N. Van Der Gaag, L. Van Wissen // Genius. – 2006. Vol. 62, №. 2. P. 37-38. 
30 Naito, M. Integration or Exile: German "Ausländerpolitik" And Turkish Migrants / M. Naito // Hitotsubashi 
Journal of Social Studies. – 1995. Vol. 27, Special Issue: Proceedings of The Hitotsubashi University International 
Symposium On "The World and Japan in the Age of Multiculturalism. P. 71. 
31 Czaika, M. de Haas, H. The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More Migratory? / M. Czaika, H. 
de Haas // The International Migration Review. – 2014. Vol. 48, №. 2. P. 285. 
32 Jones, W. Teytelboym, A. Rohac, D. Europe’s Refugee Crisis Pressure Points and Solutions / W. Jones, A. 
Teytelboym, D. Rohac // American Enterprise Institute. – 2017. – P. 4-5. 
33 Lindgaard, J. EU Public Opinion on Turkish EU Membership: Trends and Drivers / J. Lindgaard // FEUTURE. – 
2018. Online Paper №. 25. – P. 1. 
34 Nas, Ç. The EU's Approach to the Syrian Crisis: Turkey as a Partner? / Ç. Nas // Uluslararası İlişkiler-
International Relations. – 2019. Vol. 16, №. 62. – P. 64. 
35 Pinos, J. C. Building Fortress Europe? Schengen and the Cases of Ceuta and Melilla / J. C. Pinos // Centre for 
International Border Research. – 2019. – P. 4. 
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can be classified chronologically as well – from the emergence of Copenhagen School’s 
securitisation theory approach between the late 1980s-1990s, to its subsequent progression and 
additions of the Paris School, up to the most modern approaches to the theory of the 2000’s and 
2010’s. The earlier works include those of Buzan36, Wæver37, Wæver et al.38, Buzan et al.39 and 
Baldwin40. Moving on to the 2000s, the literature incorporates Huysmans41, Bigo42, Williams43, 
Smith44, Emmers45 and Balzacq46. Furthermore, chronological classification can be used for the 
specific issue of securitisation of migration, as it started out to gain interest in the late 1990s and 
 
36 Buzan, B. People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations / B. Buzan. – 
Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books LTD., 1983. – P. 1-217. 
37 Wæver, O. Security, the Speech Act: Analysing the Politics of a Word / O. Wæver // Paper presented at the 
Research Training Seminar, Sostrup Manor (June, 1989). – P. 3. 
Wæver, O. Securitization and Desecuritization / O. Wæver // On Security / ed.: R. Lipschutz. – New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995. – P. 46-85. 
38 Wæver, O. Buzan, B. Kelstrup, M. Lemaitre, P. Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe / O. 
Wæver, B. Buzan, B. M. Kelstrup, P. Lemaitre. – New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. – P. 23-45. 
39 Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J.H. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. – P. 23-122. 
40 Baldwin, D. A. The Concept of Security / D. A. Baldwin // Review of International Studies. – 1997. Vol. 23. – P. 
8. 
41 Huysmans, J. Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security / 
J. Huysmans // Alternatives. – 2002. Vol. 27: Special Issue. – P. 43. 
Huysmans, J. What’s in an act? On security speech acts and little security nothings / J. Huysmans // Security 
Dialogue. – 2011. Vol. 42. – P. 372-376. 
42 Bigo, D. When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe / D. Bigo // International 
Relations Theory and The Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community / ed.: M. Kelstrup, M. 
C. Williams. – London: Routledge, 2000. – P. 172-174. 
Bigo, D. Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease / D. Bigo // Alternatives. – 
2002. Vol. 27: Special Issue. – P. 72-79. 
43 Williams, M. C. Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics / M. C. Williams // 
International Studies Quarterly – 2003. Vol. 47, №. 4. – P. 511. 
44 Smith, S. The Contested Concept of Security / S. Smith // Critical Security Studies and World Politics / ed.: K. 
Booth. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005. – P. 2-37. 
45 Emmers, R. Securitization / R. Emmers // Contemporary Security Studies / ed.: A. Collins. – Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007. – P.139. 
46 Balzacq, T. The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies / T. 
Balzacq // Journal of Common Market Studies. – 2008. Vol. 46, №. 1. – P. 76. 
Balzacq, T. ‘Securitization’ revisited: theory and cases / T. Balzacq // International relations. – 2016. Vol. 30, №. 4. 
– P. 12. 
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arguably reached its peak due to the European Migrant Crisis in the 2010’s, with both the 
Copenhagen School’s and the Paris School’s representatives still producing important works on 
the issue. Examples of earlier works include Huysmans47, Buonfino48, Ibrahim49, Karyotis et 
al.50, while more contemporary works can be represented by Vaughan-Williams51, Tsoukala52 
and Völkel53.  
 
The addition of the present research to the previous literature on securitisation theory and the 
European migrant crisis stands in the focus on EU institutions themselves, not taking into 
account significantly the position of Member States and the disagreements within the EU on the 
highly politicised topic of migration. It focuses on specific main policies of the EU as an 
institution and explores them through the lens of securitisation theory with both discourse and 
policy analysis and the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods – the most complete set 
of methodology for the application of securitisation theory, which is rarely encountered in 
previous works. These methodology shortcomings were specifically pointed out by Baele and 
Sterck in their 2014 article on the securitisation of migration in Europe, where they proposed a 
more effective and complete research method for the application of securitisation theory.54 Thus, 
 
47 Huysmans, J. The European Union and the Securitisation of Migration / J. Huysmans // Journal of Common 
Market Studies. – 2000. Vol. 38, №. 5. – P. 751-771. 
Huysmans, J. The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU / J. Huysmans // New International 
Relations Series. – London: Routledge, 2006. – P. 65-153. 
48 Buonfino, A. Politics, Discourse and Immigration as a security concern in the EU: a tale of two nations, Italy and 
Britain / A. Buonfino // Paper to be presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Uppsala (2004). – P. 19. 
49 Ibrahim, M. The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse / M. Ibrahim // International Migration. – 2005. 
Vol. 43, №. 5. – P. 167-169. 
50 Karyotis, G. Patrikios, S. Religion, securitization and anti-immigration attitudes: The case of Greece / G. 
Karyotis, S. Patrikios // Journal of Peace Research. – 2010. Vol. 47, №. 1. – P. 46-47. 
51 Vaughan-Williams, N. Europe’s Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond / N. Vaughan-Williams. – 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. – P. 3. 
52 Tsoukala, A. Looking at Migrants as Enemies / A. Tsoukala // Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and 
Within Europe / ed.: D. Bigo, E, Guild. – London: Routledge, 2017. – P. 161. 
53 Völkel, J. C. When Interior Ministers play diplomats. Fatal ambiguities in Europe’s securitised migration policy / 
J. C. Völkel // Fortress Europe? Challenges and Failures of Migration and Asylum Policies / ed.: A. Jünemann, N. 
Fromm, N. Scherer. – Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2017. – P. 86-93. 
54 Baele, S. J. Sterck, O. C. Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A New Method for 
Stronger Empirical Claims. – P. 1120. 
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their proposed methodology combining qualitative and quantitative methods will be applied in 
this research as well. Consequently, the resulting analysis will include unbiased quantitative 
content analysis combined with qualitative discourse analysis, in order to provide more validity 
to the results.  
 
  
Limitations to the Research 
 
 
As previously mentioned, in the course of the present research the focus will be given to the 
main policies of the collective institutions of the European Union which were decided in the 
aftermath of the migrant crisis of 2015-2016. The most noteworthy policies and decisions that 
will be evaluated in this dissertation are composed of 1) the quota system introduced in 2015 to 
facilitate the resettlement of refugees and migrants arriving in the European Union, 2) the EU-
Turkey deal on refugees, which represents the most noteworthy example of cooperation of the 
EU with third states on the refugee issue, and 3) the continually reinforced role of the European 
Border and Coast Guard (Frontex), which continues to take place to this day. These three main 
policies will be examined through the lens of securitisation theory and it will be evaluated and 
revealed how migration is securitised through them.  
 
In addition, and on a more complementary scale, other notable policies of the EU institutions and 
agencies shall also be mentioned, as well as some policies and positions of separate Member 
States, in order to provide a more holistic picture of the issue. Nonetheless, the final research 
results will be based on the aforementioned three main EU policies and for the sake of this study 
it will be considered that the positions of separate Member States do not affect the official EU 
positions as an independent international organisation with strict decision-making procedures 
obligatory for all its Members. The Council of the European Union holds legislative and policy-
making powers along with the European Parliament. It also has special decision-making 
procedures in the form of consensus and qualified majority voting (QMV), in case consensus 
cannot be reached. According to Article 16 of the Lisbon Treaty which is applicable to this day, 
the qualified majority option as a binding voting mechanism was extended to multiple areas, 
among which are common foreign and security policy, asylum, immigration, and border 
 20 
control.55 Therefore, even if there is disagreement between Member States on specific issues and 
there is no opportunity for consensus, the topic can be put to the vote and in case it is voted 
through with qualified majority, states that compose the minority have to comply with the rules. 
The Member States are fully aware of these regulations and despite the fact that they may not 
wish to belong to the minority, they still have to follow the final decision because after being 
voted through, it becomes an official EU law and there is no opportunity to decline its 
application. Thus, despite some separate positions or policies of specific Member States of the 
EU, their importance will be considered only as a non-integral variable component of the 
institutional position of the EU towards the 2015-2016 migrant crisis – which is the primary 




















55 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union of 26 October, 2012 // Official Journal of the European 
Union. – 2012. Article 16. – P. 24. 
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Chapter 1 





1.1. Securitisation Theory 
 
 
Securitisation theory can be positively called a European academic brainchild, which was 
developed during the late 1980s-1990s. It has a direct connection with the so-called Copenhagen 
School of security studies, which follows a more social constructivist approach to the concept of 
security. The School initially emerged from Copenhagen’s Peace Research Institute (CORPI) 
and its formation can be directly attributed to Barry Buzan’s fundamental 1983 work “People, 
States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations”. In fact, one of the 
Institute’s research projects was entitled “Non-military Aspects of European Security,” 
previewing the direction of the emerging field of securitisation.56 Bill McSweeney first uses the 
name “Copenhagen School” in 1996 and underlines the importance of Buzan’s work: “His book 
and the revisions of the second edition (1991) have been the stimulus for further exploration of 
the security problem at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen. Together 
with Buzan, the collaborators have produced several publications on the security theme, 
sufficiently interrelated to warrant the collective shorthand the ‘Copenhagen school’ of security 
studies.”57  
 
Some of the most notable architects of the theory also include Ole Wæver and a range of other 
scholars from the Copenhagen School, as well as representatives of further revisions of the 
theory – notably the Paris School. While Buzan initialised the reconceptualisation of security in 
the 1980s, the inception of the securitisation concept can be attributed to Wæver in the mid-
1990s, at which point more holistic scholarly works on the theory started to emerge. Already in 
1989, Wæver first conceptualised securitisation in his paper “Security, the Speech Act: 
 
56 Huysmans, J. Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security / J. Huysmans // European 
Journal of International Relations. – 1998. Vol. 4, №. 4. – P. 479. 
57 McSweeney, B. Review: Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School / B. McSweeney // Review of 
International Studies. – 1996. Vol. 22, №. 2. – P. 81. 
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Analysing the Politics of a Word”, examining the non-military aspects of European security and 
opening the proverbial gates to a new body of work within the field of security studies.58 
 
Initially, the novelty of securitisation theory at the time of its introduction was in the fact that it 
represented a rather radical departure from the usual way security had been perceived up to that 
point and it aimed to challenge the traditional realist and neo-realist approaches to security 
studies.59 The discursive element introduced by securitisation scholars challenged the objectivist 
vision of threats in the context of the realist perception of security.60 During the Cold War era, 
security analysis was predominantly focused on military concepts and the political contest 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The realist perception of the international 
system as a field of power struggle between nation-states dominated the polarised climate post-
WWII, as well as during the Cold War. Security was predominantly perceived as a continuation 
of the power concept from that perspective and was examined within balance of power models. 
After the end of this period, more diverse approaches to the theory of International Relations 
started to emerge, including the popular field of security studies. Within the newly developed 
critical and constructivist waves which took off in the 1980s, security was also re-considered and 
its framework was broadened to non-material ideas, such as identity and context. It was a way to 
challenge the monopoly of the military within the field of security, by introducing concepts such 
as the environment, human rights or health as belonging to the security realm. Barry Buzan 
characteristically writes back in 1983 that “security clearly is a difficult concept” and recognises, 
in the words of W.B. Gallie, that it is also an “essentially contested concept”.61 Therefore, 
security is perceived as largely dependent on context and it can be subjective, rather than simply 
represent a universal and positive concept. 
 
 
58 Wæver, O. Security, the Speech Act: Analysing the Politics of a Word / O. Wæver // Paper presented at the 
Research Training Seminar, Sostrup Manor (June, 1989). – P. 3. 
59 Williams, M. C. Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics / M. C. Williams // 
International Studies Quarterly. – 2003. Vol. 47, №. 4. – P. 511. 
60 Wæver, O. Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools in Security Theory and their Origins between Core 
and Periphery / O. Wæver // International Studies Association Conference (17–20 March, Montreal) / International 
Studies Association, 2004. – P. 8. 
61 Buzan, B. People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations / B. Buzan. – 
Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books LTD., 1983. – P. 7. 
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The word itself – “security,” in its traditional positive perception represents in most minds the 
existence of a specific threat against which protection must be provided. In that sense, security 
analysis can be called the process of determining the biggest threats and the subsequent ways to 
deal with them, which then have to be finalised by policy makers. Securitisation theory, on the 
other hand, reverses this process and suggests that not only traditional security threats can fit 
within the concept of “security”. This search for a new approach to security emerged from the 
lacking attempts within the academic community to define it as an independent concept. In fact, 
Buzan described security as “an underdeveloped concept,” in addition to underscoring the lack 
of “conceptual literature on security” before the 1980s, which was still evident in the following 
years.62 Defining security as a concept is also a drastically different endeavour from evaluating 
the conditions under which it can be obtained – which had been the prevalent object of security 
studies. David A. Baldwin accurately writes that “military force, not security, has been the 
central concern of security studies.”63 
 
Buzan then underscores the inter-subjectivity of the security concept, explaining that “the word 
itself implies an absolute condition – something is either secure or insecure – and does not lend 
itself to the idea of a measurably-graded spectrum like that which fills the space between hot and 
cold.”64 Furthermore, bringing in the element of context and subjectivity, he points out that it is 
insufficient to study the concept of security without specifying a “referent object” – what it is 
that has to be secured. 65 But the search for this referent object must also be combined with the 
determination of its necessary conditions, thus combining concept and empirical examination. 
For instance, something that creates positive security for the state, such as surveillance 
technology, can also be used as a method of control over its citizens, thus creating negative 
security for them. Therefore, Buzan insists that security of the individual, the state and the 
international system is intertwined and “no inference should be drawn that security can be 
isolated for treatment at any single level”.66 He also develops the so-called “security sectors” to 
underscore the interconnection present within the concept of security threats. Thus, apart from 
 
62 Ibid. – P. 1. 
63 Baldwin, D. A. The Concept of Security / D. A. Baldwin // Review of International Studies. – 1997. Vol. 23. – P. 
8. 
64 Buzan, B. People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations. – P. 217. 
65 Ibid. – P. 10. 
66 Ibid. – P. 14. 
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the already widely used sector of military security, he adds economic, political, societal and 
ecological levels of security analysis.67 
 
Despite initially viewing the referent object as more state-centric, Buzan later develops the 
concept of “societal security” as more fitting to examine the European security agenda after the 
Cold War.68 Wæver then proposes to evolve Buzan’s five suggested sectors of state security and 
reconceptualise them as a duality of state and societal security instead.69 He also notes the 
limiting consideration of the state as the usual primary referent object within the field of security 
and proposes a solution – “My colleagues and I have therefore suggested a reconceptualisation 
of the security field in terms of a duality of state security and societal security.”70 This shift was 
significant, as it allowed for the inclusion of issues such as migration in the security sphere, 
whereas before it could not qualify for the state security debate. Within this framework, for the 
sake of answering a specific research question, the researcher can determine their own research 
object and focus on its environment – whether it’s the individual, the state, or the international 
system. In this case, it will be important to ask for whom, from what and by whom security is 
provided.  
 
Hence, the representatives of the Copenhagen School start to pose these questions during the 
1990s and attempt to fill the conceptual void evident in security studies. As Michael J. Sheehan 
writes in 2005, this expansion of the security concept was a significant development that broke 
the traditional stereotype of it as being largely limited to national security.71 Steve Smith also 
underscores the contribution of the Copenhagen School, calling it “one of the most interesting 
developments in the contemporary study of security”.72 In one of the most prominent scholarship 
 
67 Ibid. – P. 75. 
68 Smith, S. The Contested Concept of Security / S. Smith // Critical Security Studies and World Politics / ed.: 
Booth, K. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005. – P. 2. 
69 Wæver, O. Buzan, B. Kelstrup, M. Lemaitre, P. Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe / O. 
Wæver, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, P. Lemaitre. – New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. – P. 23. 
70 Wæver, O. Securitization and Desecuritization / O. Wæver // On Security / ed.: R. Lipschutz. – New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995. – P. 55. 
71 Sheehan, M. J. International Security: An Analytical Survey / M. J. Sheehan. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
2005. – P. 48. 
72 Smith, S. The Contested Concept of Security / S. Smith // Critical Security Studies and World Politics / ed.: K. 
Booth. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005. – P. 37. 
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works of the School, which gave the concept of securitisation its most complete treatment to date 
– “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, security is 
defined as a “speech act” – “by saying the words, something is done”. 73 This conceptualisation 
of securitisation is a significant step, which indicates that words do not only depict reality but 
can also construct it. For example, calling the Greek refugee camp Moria a “living hell”74 creates 
an image of lawlessness, wretchedness and misery – adding to the contempt over the issue of the 
migrant crisis in Europe. In the same way, repeatedly connecting the issue of migration with 
security in socio-political discourse creates a sense of urgency, even by merely making that 
verbal connection. 
 
Therefore, it is evident that securitisation analysis should study the discourse around the threats 
instead of the nature of those threats, since socio-political context can determine certain things as 
threats and policy makers themselves can classify them as security problems. For instance, just 
like migration, climate change can be named a security threat – an existential problem that could 
be overriding normal issues. From that perspective, dealing with this arisen problem becomes a 
priority – a necessity, and not just an object of normal politics. Thus, because it is a necessity, it 
is not bound by normal political rules and extraordinary measures can be allowed – such as 
deployment of weapons, special services or political violence. The urgency of the situation 
legitimises the measures – something that otherwise could not be done is considered necessary 
and the relevant audience recognises that, granting policy makers the right for the respective 
extraordinary measures. As written by Buzan et al., “the distinguishing feature of securitisation 
is a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action “because if the problem is not 
handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure”).75 Consequently, 
this approach departs from the traditional notion of “security” and “threat,” developing them as 
more critical and discursive concepts. 
 
 
73 Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J.H. Security: A New Framework for Analysis / Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, 
J.H. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998. – P. 26. 
74 Chapman, A. A doctor’s story: inside the ‘living hell’ of Moria refugee camp [Electronic resource] / A. Chapman 
// The Guardian, 2020. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/09/moria-refugee-camp-doctors-story-
lesbos-greece (accessed: 07.04.2020) 
75 Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J. H. Security: A New Framework for Analysis / B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. H. de 
Wilde. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998. – P. 26. 
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As previously mentioned, a central component for securitisation theory is the referent object, but 
there are others that deserve equal attention. Overall, the so-called “securitising move” is shaped 
by four fundamental pieces: the referent object, the securitising actor, the existential threat, and 
the audience. As pointed out by Buzan et al., the key points are “who securitises, on what issues 
(threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what 
conditions what explains when securitisation is successful)”.76 This creates an apparatus of 
closely tied concepts that researchers can use and apply in a specific case, in order to 
demonstrate the basic idea of securitisation. The formation of the securitisation move occurs 
when a referent object depicts an existential threat and justifies to the relevant audience the use 
of specific extraordinary measures – something vital, such as the state, freedom, or future 
welfare has to survive. In “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security,” Buzan 
and Wæver examine the existence of securitisation in the implementation of extraordinary 
measures, thus indicating that the issue is securitised in the final step of the process and not in 
the initial one – when the issue is taken into the realm of security through a speech act.77 
 
The concepts of the referent object and the securitising actor are important within this pattern 
because they define what is securitised and by whom. For instance, in broad terms it could be 
assumed that the state itself may want to securitise the state in order to survive. But usually there 
is more distinction to such situations, for instance when the state is seen as a nation – an identity 
community – in which case groups of people, such as political parties, can speak on behalf of the 
society and attempt to securitise it against external threats. As Wæver points out: “But societies 
are, of course, highly differentiated, full of hierarchies and institutions, with some better placed 
than others to speak on behalf of "their" societies. But "society" never speaks, it is only there to 
be spoken for.”78 Thus, the analysis becomes more specific and more distinct, allowing the 
application of securitisation theory for a multitude of cases. 
 
Then, the existential threat is also an essential piece of the securitising move. It represents an 
extraordinary problem that has to be resolved no matter what – it is unacceptable to be left 
 
76 Ibid. – P. 32. 
77 Buzan, B. Wæver, O. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security / B. Buzan, O. Wæver. – 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. – P. 73. 
78 Wæver, O. Securitization and Desecuritization / O. Wæver // On Security / ed.: R. Lipschutz. – New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995. – P. 85. 
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unmanaged. Therefore, it must be prioritised and treated with a sense of urgency through the 
implementation of extraordinary measures. Those measures are also the price of security, since 
they require effort and have a cost. In that sense, security can be seen as a necessary evil 
requiring the handling of a problem through extraordinary means, when normal measures are not 
sufficient. From this perspective, security may also be considered as an extreme form of 
politicisation, since the framing of the issue as requiring emergency means “takes politics 
beyond the established rules of the game”.79 Furthermore, Copenhagen School insists that 
security gained through the application of emergency measures and the bypassing of the usual 
democratic procedures is not the preferable option – “It is better, as Wæver argues, to aim for 
desecuritisation: the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining 
processes of the political sphere.”80 Wæver also suggests that de-securitising politics “would be 
more effective than securitising problems”.81 Moreover, the process of de-securitisation itself is 
also a new important agenda in security studies that is worthy of analysis – the “unmaking” of a 
security problem. If certain phaenomena can be securitised, then they can be de-securitised as 
well and this offers more understanding to the creation of specific security issues. For instance, 
migration was securitised in the early 20th century, but was later de-securitised post-WWII when 
many European countries were in need of additional workforce to develop their economies.82 
 
Last, but not least, the role of the audience is extremely important, because only in the case that 
the audience accepts the securitising move and offers its consent can the actual securitisation of 
the issue occur. Emmers underlines the role of the audience, indicating that the successful 
securitising move depends on the conviction of the audience that a referent object indeed suffers 
from an existential threat.83 Moreover, “if no signs of such acceptance exist, we can talk only of 
a securitising move, not of an object actually being securitised,” is specifically pointed out by 
 
79 Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J. H. Security: A New Framework for Analysis / B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. H. de 
Wilde. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998. – P. 23. 
80 Ibid. – P. 4. 
81 Wæver, O. Securitization and Desecuritization / O. Wæver // On Security / ed.: R. Lipschutz. – New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995. – P. 57. 
82 Huysmans, J. The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU / J. Huysmans // New 
International Relations Series. – London: Routledge, 2006. – P. 126. 
83 Emmers, R. Securitization / R. Emmers // Contemporary Security Studies / ed.: A. Collins. – Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007. – P.139. 
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Buzan et al. 84 Essentially, it’s not only a matter of threat speak – anyone can claim something is 
a threat. It must be something more – the acceptance of the audience that because of this alleged 
threat they will be willing to resort to extraordinary measures, like military action or border 
closures. In that sense, the final decision is on a way taken by the relevant audience, which 
allows and gives validity to such measures. But this does not only apply to the audience of a 
democratic state, for instance, and can be equally relevant in any other political system.85 
Subsequently, depending on its structure, the audience can be a specific group of people, such as 
an inner circle of generals in an autocratic system. Even in this situation, the leaders of the state 
have to justify the validity of extraordinary measures and explain their necessity in order to 
convince their audience. That is the crucial point when securitisation takes place and moves an 
issue into the security sphere. 
 
As a result of its detailed approach, securitisation theory can be applied in many different case 
studies, which can include a specific side of a conflict or an entire conflict constellation, with the 
examining of multiple sides. The processes of securitisation can then be singled out and various 
security constructions can be studied separately or against each other. The researchers can then 
make their conclusions about the nature of securitisation of a specific issue and examine whether 
it could even be de-securitised – taken out of the security realm and back into the sphere of 
normal politics, thus de-escalating the level of securitisation. In this case, the role of the security 
analyst is to observe and interpret and it should not be confused with the role of the securitising 
actor. The analyst does not judge the actor’s actions, but merely examines the conditions under 
which they take place86 – whether the actor has managed to gain support, what is their audience, 
the type of extraordinary measures that have taken place and what could be the implications of 
such securitising practice. 
 
This approach made the theory popular among scholars studying issues that had not traditionally 
been considered as part of the mainstream security realm until the 1990s – such as climate 
change, human rights, or immigration. The focus had therefore been shifted from state security 
in the more realist terms of sovereignty and anarchy, to concepts such as identity, community 
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and individuals.87 It is also an interesting process to examine how exactly these issues fit into the 
security framing and whether the security labelling changes something within them or causes 
new types of actions around them. A lot of the scholarly works on securitisation theory have 
focused on exactly this – exploring what happens when an issue is transformed from non-
security to security. It is a process of examining which referent objects gain the interest of 
securitising actors and why, which threats earn the biggest focus and which extraordinary 
measures are then decided. The studying of this process is a powerful tool provided by 
securitisation theory as a significant contribution to security studies. 
 
Nonetheless, the theory has also produced its critics, notably noting the normative dilemma 
within securitisation. As analysts applying securitisation theory are to remain objective in their 
evaluation and merely observe, it is difficult to speak or write security without becoming part of 
the performative power of the securitisation process. Jef Huysmans points out that there is a risk 
of becoming impartial to subjectivity in security studies and replicating the fearmongering of 
policy makers, if not legitimising their actions. “Speaking and writing about security is never 
innocent,” he states.88 Didier Bigo also shows a concern for the conceptualisation of security 
applied in securitisation theory, more specifically in the notion that exceptional and even 
“measures beyond the law” are necessary for securitisation, further adding to the sense of 
emergency and danger.89 
 
Overall, these critiques emerged from the so-called Paris School, with both Huysmans and Bigo 
representing its direction in security studies, focusing on the way security is institutionalised and 
how this leads to securitisation. Furthermore, the Paris School pays attention to bureaucratic 
processes taking place in the security apparatus and shifts its analysis towards policies,90 as 
opposed to Copenhagen School’s focus on rhetorical structure and discourse in the process of 
securitisation. Huysmans therefore argues that in the framing of security as a speech act, “the 
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notion of ‘act’ rather than speech carries the political investment… of the securitisation 
approach”.91 He then goes on to point out that while a lot of focus had been given to the study of 
speech, discourse and rhetorical structures of security language, the part involving the “act” itself 
had been offered far less attention and examined largely as a result of the performative power of 
speech.92 Furthermore, Huysmans pays attention to the role of institutions within the security 
complex, indicating how securitisation can creep up through institutionalised practices that do 
not gain a lot of prior showcasing: “Securitising in contemporary world politics develops 
significantly through unspectacular processes of technologically driven surveillance, risk 
management, and precautionary governance. These processes are less about declaring a 
territorialised enemy and threat of war than about dispersing techniques of administering 
uncertainty and ‘mapping’ dangers.”93 This also largely coincides with Bigo’s work on 
securitisation as a result of institutionalisation of security. For instance, he points out: “Internal 
(in)security must be analysed in connection with institutional knowledge and knowledge of the 
agencies, their devices and practices, including their discursive practices, as these are 
determinant factors in understanding how definitions of those who provoke fear, the adversary 
and the enemy are socially constructed”.94  
 
Furthermore, Huysmans and the representatives of the Paris School view the process of 
securitisation as more technocratic and one where internal and external security sometimes 
merge, spilling out on a transnational level – which can be observed in the security agencies of 
the European Union, for example.95 The bureaucratic actors thus have a privilege to securitise 
issues through their routine practices which can construct and transfer meanings of security to 
the audience. This way, a pattern or a trend can be formed in which the exceptional state of 
affairs requiring extraordinary measures becomes the norm and no longer has a sense of dramatic 
change, which was evident in the conceptualisation of securitisation by the Copenhagen School. 
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When we transfer to the realm of “extraordinary means as the norm”, Balzacq suggests that the 
consent of the audience no longer plays such a significant role, because the process has already 
been institutionalised.96  
 
Overall, the two Schools complete each other’s work by providing a comprehensive analysis of 
both the discourse – the formation of the securitising move, and the policy – applied as the result 
of the securitising move. The study of securitisation processes thus becomes more complete and 
equipped with a sufficient set of tools. 
 
 
1.2. Securitisation of Migration 
 
 
Migration was not always traditionally seen as a potential threat. In post-WWII Europe, it 
represented economic development, as it provided the necessary workforce to rebuild after the 
war. But as the world transitioned to its post-Cold War state, things started to shift. The 
marginalised concerns within the security realm that departed from the traditional focus on state-
military reached the forefront of academic interest with the development of critical and 
constructivist directions in the security field. Thus, migration also started to be viewed as an 
issue within the security realm with the emergence of the new directions in security studies from 
the 1980s. Ibrahim notes that “with the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has 
undergone a transformation. As a result, migration has increasingly been described in security 
terms”.97 Subsequently, the perception of migration as a threat to the nation’s identity, economic 
prosperity and safety became rather commonplace in the EU, especially with the observed 
increase of arrivals of third-country nationals to Europe in the past decades. The terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001 have also contributed to the general sense of unease surrounding the issue 
of immigration. Since then, various directions in security studies have focused on the study of 
migration as a security issue, with the most prominent being securitisation theory developed by 
the Copenhagen School. 
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According to Wæver, state security should be considered alongside societal security98 – a 
concept which contributed to the broadening of the security sphere and allowed issues such as 
migration to fit into it. Consequently, Buzan et al. describe migration as one of the main points in 
the societal security agenda – more specifically, they indicate how migration can become a 
security threat through the changes that it may provoke to the national identity. The community 
may change with the transformation of population through cultural and linguistic influence from 
the newcomers, with people starting to see themselves differently as a result. In this case, the 
identity of the citizens is seen as being threatened by the arrival of migrants.99 This situation may 
lead to migration finding itself on the security agenda of a state: “Society can react to such 
threats in two ways: through activities carried out by the community itself or by trying to move 
the issue to the political (and potentially the military) sector by having the threat placed on the 
state agenda. At the state level, the threat of immigration, for example, can be addressed through 
legislation and border controls.”100 Thus, escaping from the traditional security threats of the 
Cold War that were mostly military in nature, the concerns that fit within the security sphere 
multiplied and provoked subsequent arrangements from states. In EU, the protection and control 
of outer borders, as well as the introduction of new respective policies has become essential, 
since migration has evolved into an existential threat and has gained both national and 
international dimensions. For instance, new institutions like Frontex were added to the EU 
framework of migration management and policies like the Quota System were introduced, in 
addition to the progressing development of a common asylum policy. 
 
However, this was not the case during the 1950s and 1960s, when migrant communities were 
seen as additional manpower in much of Western Europe. The deteriorated post-War economic 
conditions prompted countries like Germany, France and the Netherlands to promote positive 
migration policies in order to attract extra labour force. This was a way to gain competitive 
advantage with cheaper and more flexible workforce, against the more expensive domestic 
options. As a consequence, the legal status of migrants as guest workers was of far less interest 
to European societies than it is today. But the situation changed in the following decades: more 
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restrictive migration policies started to be introduced in the late 1960s-1970s, in order to protect 
the social rights and welfare of the domestic workforce in the labour market. Huysmans suggests 
the European Council Regulation №1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers101 as the first 
example of securitisation of migration in Europe post-WWII. The guest workers also started to 
gain more permanent residence status and as family reunions occurred, their population numbers 
increased, which, in turns, contributed to the development of bigger public awareness of the 
presence of migrant communities. Subsequently, political discourse started to link migration to 
undermining of public order.102 Afterwards, during the 1980s, a common European migration 
policy became one of the priorities in European integration processes and thus it started to be 
institutionalised and take collective form. Intergovernmental cooperation on immigration 
policies was established and agreements such as the Schengen Treaty (1985) and the Dublin 
Regulation (1990) were signed during that period. Finally, it can be stated that by including 
immigration as one of the key themes in the European integration process, it became securitised. 
And, in the long run, the combination of the Europeanisation and the securitisation of 
immigration in the EU resulted in a greater focus of the issue in security terms and led to security 
policies that aimed at protecting the external European borders.  
 
Therefore, the issue of European internal security has developed over time to include 
immigration as one of its key components, as indicated by Huysmans. More specifically, he 
writes that Pillar III of the EU on cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, the Dublin 
Convention and the Schengen Agreement all encompass the development of a common 
restrictive migration policy within the European area.103 This further reflects the social 
construction of immigration as a security problem within the EU, which started to emerge since 
the 1980s and represented the perception of migration as a potential threat to European 
integration. The association of the immigration issue with criminality and even terrorism post-
9/11 – especially in the case of Arab and Muslim immigrants, has occurred in an environment of 
a general politicisation where migrants and refugees are seen as a threat to national identity, 
welfare and unity. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, migration became an existential 
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security issue in the entire Western world, starting to be perceived as a direct threat to national 
safety. Bourbeau observes this change: “By the end of the 1990s (i.e. before 9/11), the United 
States Immigration and Naturalisation Service had more employees authorised to carry guns that 
any other federal enforcement force. International migration has become a key security issue and 
is perceived, in some eyes, as an existential security threat”.104 Later on, after the tensions 
provoked by the Arab Spring in the early 2010s, the increasing influx of immigrants to Europe 
was described as an “invasion,” adding to the growing rhetoric of danger surrounding the 
issue.105 These events saw countries such as France and Italy campaign for the reintroduction of 
temporary internal borders within the Schengen area.106  
 
Subsequently, the height of the 2015-2016 migrant crisis in Europe further deepened the 
connection between the security and immigration issues, overtaking the political agenda in 
Europe. The culmination of this rhetoric on migration has become known as “Fortress Europe” – 
an idea which already from the early 2000s had been representing the closure of European 
borders to irregular migrants through a system of strict border checks, as well as erection of 
walls and detention centres. Overall, the concept of “Fortress” has dual meaning for Europe and 
while it has been seen in a positive light by populist and nationalist movements in the EU, for 
others it represents a shameful notion – the distancing from traditional humanitarian European 
values. It is also seen as a discursive concept and more symbolic, rather than a representation of 
a set of official policies, as the term itself is not designated to include specific meanings. 
According to Jaume Castan Pinos, “the notion of Fortress Europe has become more associated 
with a politics of symbols rather than state capacity to control immigration”.107 Nonetheless, the 
fact remains that migration has firmly established itself as part of the security realm in European 
discourse and five years after the start of the migrant crisis the situation has not changed. 
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Furthermore, as the focus of security studies started to shift from state to societal aspects, in the 
same way if started to pay more attention to the individual. This brings forward the notion of 
cultural identity, which is seen as threatened through migration because it comes with different 
customs, languages, ethnicities and religions. Wæver observes that “survival for a society is a 
question of identity, because this is the way a society talks about existential threats: if this 
happens, we will no longer be able to live as ‘us’”.108 The subsequent sentiment of “us” versus 
“them” is therefore evident in this rhetoric – the identity of the accepting country is in danger of 
being transformed under the weight of the migrants’ own identities. A divide between the host 
state and the groups of migrants is therefore created. As also supported by Buzan, “the main 
threats to security come from competing identities and migration”109 and “the threat of migration 
is fundamentally a question of how relative numbers interact with the absorptive and adaptive 
capacities of society”.110  
 
This direction towards the individual was also reflected in the fact that international 
organisations and states began to discuss the issue of “human security” in addition to already 
firmly established concepts of state security and human rights. This can be both understood in 
terms of security of the migrants themselves, who often have to make dangerous journeys to 
reach their destination and live in subpar conditions, as well as in terms of security for the 
citizens of the host countries, who may see threats to their welfare and national unity in the 
arrival of third-country nationals.111 However, describing migrants as a threat to human security 
is a rhetoric popular among nationalist circles and creates concerns from a humanitarian 
perspective. Notably, in the case of the EU, the security discourse depicting migrants as a danger 
has seen a response within some states, such as the United Kingdom, where the issue of 
immigration was present at the core of the 2016 referendum vote on “Brexit” – the formal exit of 
the UK from the European Union. A study conducted by Goodwin and Milazzo in 2017 reflected 
the role of the anti-immigration sentiment for the UK citizens’ decision to vote “leave” instead 
of “remain”, indicating the public’s fears about the state of national economy, culture and 
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welfare.112 Through the use of survey data of the British Election Study (BES), the researchers of 
this study explored how anti-immigration discourse affected the public opinion. The results of 





Figure 2 – Anti-Immigration Sentiments by EU Referendum Vote Choice (%) 
Source: 2014-2017 British Election Study Internet Panel 
 
 
It was evident from the UK study that migration was in fact a notable cause for the eventual 
results of the referendum. Populist attitudes ended up prevailing and the discourse showed a 
clear anti-immigration sentiment from the perspective of societal security. At this point, it is 
important to note that the association of migration with insecurity creates a dangerous rhetoric 
and, as stated by Huysmans, “to the extent that the Europeanization of migration policy fosters 
the securitisation of migration it sustains a radical political strategy aimed at excluding particular 
categories of people by reifying them as a danger (for example, to cultural values, to the 
provision of social assistance, to public safety, to health, etc.)”.113 This construction of threat 
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speak is thus discriminatory and harmful towards migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers and 
makes their inclusion within the EU community that much more difficult. Furthermore, it goes 
against the values of solidarity, humanitarianism, social integration and civility that are promoted 
within the EU community of states. From that perspective, Huysmans accurately identifies how 
migration is securitised in Europe through a rhetoric of danger and fears of social disintegration, 
which can be identified in the previous example of the UK.  
 
Furthermore, such securitisation can also provoke interventionist politics under the umbrella of 
extraordinary measures, that may override the usual democratic procedures. In the case of Brexit, 
this was evident through the emergency procedure of a referendum and withdrawal from the EU 
– an unprecedented case for a Member State up to that point. This leads to the realisation that the 
security of EU nationals is maintained at the expense of third-country nationals, who are 
excluded from the benefits offered to the privileged European citizens. The threat rhetoric and 
the subsequent restrictive measures on migration and asylum indirectly systematise the wider 
notion that the presence of immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers is unwanted and the 
preservation of the stability and homogeneity of the EU is the more preferable option. On that 
note, Huysmans states that “emphasising restrictions and control implies a negative portrayal of 
groups of migrants. Such a policy risks sustaining public expressions of racism and xenophobia 
in the present political context”.114 The policies of migrants’ integration in European societies, 
on the other hand, while they may initially present an image of positive multiculturalism, they 
can also indirectly reflect a national motive to preserve the cultural homogeneity of society. In 
this case, migrants are once again seen as a hindrance to the preservation of cultural uniformity 
and attempts are made to resolve this by integrating them in the European societies. Therefore, 
integration policies can indirectly support the notion of migrants as “disruptors,” and that only 
integrated migrants can potentially co-exist peacefully within a societal formation, while those 
who have not been integrated successfully may present danger to uniformity.115  
 
Focusing on security policies as a whole, Huysmans (2006) questions whether these are 
generally effective ways of dealing with security problems and suggests the example of 
migration. For instance, he suggests that the role of restrictive measures on immigration and 
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asylum in the form of stricter visa obtainment policies and border controls may not be the best 
way to prevent illegal immigration. In a paradoxical way, such policies may prevent people from 
obtaining a regular visa or asylum status, thus further increasing illegal immigration because 
legal entrance into Europe will be made more difficult for them. This inherent tendency of 
security studies to view policies through a security lens is seen as rather problematic and cannot 
always represent effectiveness of a policy from an ethical and political understanding. Huysmans 
also notes the institutionalised inherent tendency of security agents to present issues through a 
security lens. For example, it is part of the police’s work to provide security knowledge – “They 
have a professional disposition to represent and categorise a policy concern in a security 
discourse and to propose security measures to deal with it.” As a result, he continues, 
“immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees are framed as a security problem which is different 
from an approach by means of a policy which emphasises that asylum is a human rights question 
and/or which proposes human rights instruments to deal with the issue”.116 Bourbeau mentions 
case studies from Canada between 1996 and 2001, where it was observed by editorials that in the 
treatment of immigrants “the government was clearly ‘paranoiac’ with its security concerns, that 
it ‘cultivates a cult of hostility,’ and that attempting to create a security fortress is pointless from 
the beginning”.117 This leads to the conclusion that while securitisation is in fact an effective way 
to study the issue of migration, it does not pre-dispose the researcher to justify specific 
institutional policies resulting from such securitisation. Thus, de-securitisation – a concept first 
suggested by Wæver, represents a suitable way to re-establish the balance between the effective 
and the ethical discussion of migration management. This process can encompass both the study 
of efficient immigration policies and the treatment of migrants as more than existential threats to 
society.118 
 
This concept also brings us to the issue of the relationship between securitisation and human 
rights. How does one affect the other and can they co-exist? According to the main presumptions 
of the theory, securitisation of migration may provoke sentiments of public concern regarding 
threat to welfare, uniformity, as well as criminality and terrorism, and can thus provide excuse 
for extraordinary exclusionary immigration policies. In that context, it may create fertile ground 
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for populism and right-wing political movements, the rise of which has been observed in Europe 
in recent years. Balzacq speaks of the field of “insecurity” mentioned by Bigo and examines the 
effects the redefinition of security can have on equality and justice: “The field of the insecurity 
professionals has brought under the same banner a variety of issues, such as migration, asylum, 
terrorism, and drug trafficking. As a result, all these issues have been handled through the 
exclusive lens of security, at the expense of other possibilities, such as social inequality or global 
injustice”.119 Buonfino, examining the phenomena of immigration in Europe – specifically the 
case of Italy, speaks of the dilemma between moral responsibility versus national security when 
it comes to migrants. She then examines the use of negative terminology in discourse about 
migrants and how this reflects on their socio-political perception: “Treating immigration and 
asylum, which are two very human phenomena, as ‘things’ to be curbed eases the process of 
securitisation and partly avoids the political confrontation with issues such as human rights, 
public feelings about the destiny of migrants”.120 Therefore, it is suggested that the issues of 
security, immigration and humanitarian values are intertwined within the European discourse. 
Buonfino then further confirms this notion, stating that “in European discourses, instead, security 
is implied within discussions of humanitarian assistance, fundamental rights and protection”.121 
Bourbeau also identifies interconnections between security problems and the issue of human 
rights within the context of international migration.122 Bigo then suggests that the humanitarian 
discourse is a by-product within the securitisation process, which oftentimes may affect a 
potential divide between recognised asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, as the former can be 
regarded as more privileged from the perspective of human rights protections.123 Tsoukala also 
contemplates the connection between the weakening of the individual’s position as the subject of 
human rights in the post-9/11 era of counter-terrorism, which she identifies as a natural outcome 
of the “prevalence of the risk-focused mindset”.124  
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Therefore, the consideration of human rights is an important aspect of securitisation that must be 
taken into account. For instance, in the analysis of migration in Greece during the 1990s, 
Karyotis and Patrikios mention that while securitisation itself was reflected in the restrictive 
immigration policies of the Greek government, those were also mostly aimed at taking care of 
short-term necessities and remained inconsiderate towards the human rights of immigrants.125 
Thus, while the conducted policy analysis reflected the presence of securitisation, it also 
indicated a lack of humanitarian considerations, which received criticism from NGOs. As Greece 
moved towards improving its international image and presenting a more cosmopolitan view of 
itself ahead of the 2004 Athens Olympics, the discourse on immigration also started to shift 
towards more positive images. New government leaders voiced their commitment towards 
treating migrants as beneficial for the country’s economic development and were aiming at a 
“substantial and effective immigration policy within a modern framework and with respect to 
human rights”.126 
 
To conclude, the process of cross-border movements of people identified as immigration is a 
complex mechanism which has been at the center of international discourse for many decades. 
But it wasn’t until the 1980s that it found itself at the forefront of security frameworks, with 
emphasis on policing and control. The inclusion of migration in the threat discourse has 
coincided with new developments in security studies – namely, new directions which were 
marginalized before the end of the Cold War, limited by the focus on the bipolarity of the 
international system. The subsequent evolution of security studies also included the development 
of securitisation theory, introduced and implemented by the scholars of the Copenhagen School. 
Securitisation thus became one of the most prominent directions in the security field to examine 
immigration as a security phenomenon and study the processes under which it becomes 
securitised in states and international communities. Since most of the scholars that developed 
and offered further additions to securitisation theory were European, they largely focused on 
examining the issue of immigration in Europe across various timelines, but especially since the 
1990s. That is why academic works on securitisation arguably offer the most comprehensive 
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analyses of European migration and represent comprehensive and holistic tools to examine this 
phenomenon.  
 
The same theoretical framework can be applied to the 2015-2016 European migrant crisis, which 
saw immigration at the core of a security rhetoric – a fact still relevant to this day, based on the 
latest observations of socio-political discourse and Eurostat polls on public opinion. The 
fundamental principles of securitsation theory apply in this case, as we have the securitising 
actors – the EU institutions; the existential threat – the mass influx of immigrants as a result of 
the Arab Spring, culminating in 2015 and 2016; the referent object – European uniformity and 
welfare; and, lastly, the audience – the European citizens, who observe the situation and 
legitimise the policies decided by the governing political institutions. The process of 
securitisation is largely discursive in nature and occurs through a “speech act”, but the result of 
securitisation observed in the decided policies is also an important piece of the puzzle, which 
offers a complete picture of language and action combined. For this reason, both the discourse 
and the actual policies it results in have to be examined. Furthermore, the consideration of 
humanitarian concerns is also important within this framework, as it offers a viewpoint of the 



















2.1. Origins of the Crisis 
 
 
The issue of mass displacement and migration has turned into one of the most prominent 
political issues of our times. However, it is by no means a new phenomenon. Refugee crises and 
mass migration are complex issues that the world has already dealt with for many decades. These 
events have been fuelled primarily by conflict, political instability and environmental or 
economic collapse. But they also depend on many other different elements, such as historical and 
cultural ties, demographic factors and social conditions. Moreover, the processes of migration 
are also affected by the deeper transformations happening in the world due to the rapidly 
progressing processes of globalisation. As a result, the issue of world migration presents an 
increasingly changeable and complex picture, which has to be approached taking into account 
many different variables. 
 
Until World War II, the European migration waves were predominantly negative, as millions of 
people decided to cross the ocean to reach the New World. Approximately 55 to 60 million 
Europeans made the trip between 1820-1940, the majority of which settled in the United States. 
Nonetheless, there were also movements within Europe – while the Western part of the continent 
maintained a fairly positive migration balance, the other regions presented a largely different 
picture, since people attempted to leave the more economically depressed parts of Europe to 
reach the more developed ones. For instance, many Ukrainian and Polish workers settled in 
France or Germany, while Italians also sought work in France, as well as in Switzerland.127 This 
picture mostly characterised the migration movements in Europe until the post-war period.  
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Subsequently, one of the biggest changes in the history of humanity took place after World War 
II, when the entire international system was essentially restructured and the world attempted to 
return to stability amidst a sense of geopolitical and economic uncertainty. This period also 
produced one of the largest mass migration waves in history, which possessed different 
characteristics compared to the previous pre-war migration patterns. More specifically, three 
phenomena affected the European migration movements in the second half of the 20th century: 
shortage of labour force in Western and Northern Europe, the process of decolonisation, as well 
as the existence and the subsequent fall of the Soviet Bloc.128 
 
Firstly, many European countries attempted to rebuild their national economies in the aftermath 
of the war and attracting migrants became a viable prospective to fuel that progress, especially 
amid a significant shortage in local labour force. By estimation, approximately 20 to 30 million 
migrant workers along with their family members travelled around Europe in search of 
occupation and improved living conditions after World War II.129 For instance, West Germany 
was one of the countries who had the biggest need for additional labour manpower in order to 
support its recovering economy. Until the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, this shortage in 
workers was predominantly covered by the arriving migrants from East Germany. However, 
after the erection of the Berlin Wall this was no longer an option and West Germany had to find 
other solutions to its problem of workforce shortage. Thus, special agreements for the 
recruitment of workers were signed by West German authorities in the early 1960s with various 
countries such as Turkey, Italy, Spain, Greece, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. This 
way, the Federal Republic of Germany accepted a major inflow of labour force, representatives 
of which were commonly known as “Gastarbeiter”. During that time, Turkey was one of the 
countries providing Europe with the biggest supply of additional manpower, concluding 
agreements with Austria, Sweden, France, the Netherlands and Belgium, in addition to West 
Germany.130  
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Moreover, the process of migration to Europe was further facilitated by the pre-existing ties 
between European countries and their former colonies, even after the process of decolonisation 
had started. This was initially reflected in the mass returns of Europeans who had settled in the 
colonies back to their native countries. For instance, arrivals of over one million people were 
estimated to have occurred in France from Algeria. But equally significant inflows of returnees 
were noted for France from other colonies, as well as for the United Kingdom, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Italy. Subsequently, these movements were followed by new 
migration waves of native populations of the former colonies to the European countries they 
were formerly controlled by. Major inflows of people were thus recorded for countries such as 
the United Kingdom, Netherlands, France and Portugal.131 Overall, in the aftermath of the 
process of decolonisation, a lot of the post-war migrants came from former European colonies, 
such as India, Pakistan, Vietnam, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, among others. This resulted in 
the growth of multiculturalism in Europe, as well as in a social and demographic evolution.  
 
Lastly, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain resulted in new migration 
waves from Eastern Europe and former Soviet states that reached many parts of Europe. This 
period also coincided with the age of increased market liberalisation and rapid globalisation, 
inciting political and ideological changes, as well as contributing to increased migration flows.132 
Whereas before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 there were significant political obstructions to 
emigration, as soon as they ceased to exist, residents of former Soviet countries had the 
opportunity to join the global migration movements. Furthermore, the subsequent ethnic 
conflicts in the former Soviet republics and the former Yugoslavia produced forced migration 
movements which contributed to the overall increase of emigration from these countries to 
Western Europe.133 These combined developments significantly changed the geography and 
demographics of migration flows in Europe since the early 1990s. 
 
Nonetheless, other diverse factors that contributed to the expansion of the post-war migration 
waves can also be named. One of these can be considered post-industrial migration and the 
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technological advancements of that time, which made international travel more accessible to a 
wider audience. Family migration is also a significant factor, which included family formation 
and reunification.134 Additionally, the singing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the subsequent 
continuous expansion of the European Union was also an important encouraging factor for 
positive migration to Europe. But in more recent years, another mass wave of refugees and 
migrants reached European shores, but this time it was described as a “crisis” and attracted 
massive international attention. 
 
It can be stated that the migration wave of 2015-16 was already years and even decades in the 
making, with refugees and migrants arriving in Europe since the 1980s and 1990s from conflict-
ridden states in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. For instance, from 1989 until 1992, the 
number of asylum applications had risen to 695,000 and then decreased to 455,000 by the end of 
the 1990s. In 2001, it increased again to 471,000.135 For this period, the main countries of origin 
were Yugoslavia, Romania, Turkey, Iraq and Afghanistan.136 The influx of arrivals had not 
stopped since then and only varied in numbers and origins, but was never deemed as 
unmanageable or called a “crisis.” Larivé recognises the Lampedusa shipwreck of October 3rd, 
2013, in which over 300 refugees lost their lives, as the “first wake up call for Europe”.137 It was 
shocking for Europeans to see such a tragedy, but the issue of mass migration from countries 
such as Syria, Somalia and Eritrea had soon died down and lost attention, despite warnings from 
the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).138 Furthermore, the apparent ineffectiveness 
and flawed design of the common European asylum and immigration policy was one of the signs 
that the EU would be unprepared should the migrant arrivals reach significant numbers. Even 
prior to the crisis the issue of migration regulation was one of the most politicised and weakly 
integrated European policies. Furthermore, the uneven experiences of member states with 
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immigration, their response capacity and their different political stances on the issue were 
certainly important factors that further aggravated the situation and helped to turn migration into 
one of the most sensitive topics in the European public debate. 
 
Indeed, in pure volume, the 2015-16 crisis has been the single biggest influx of immigrants to 
Europe since the Second World War, with over one million arrivals in 2015 alone.139 This wave 
of mass-migration was primarily prompted by the events known as the “Arab spring,” when 
millions of people from the Middle East, as well as North Africa, were forced to flee their homes 
in search of safer living conditions. A general political and socio-economic instability in the 
Arab world, wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya, repression in Eritrea were all among the causes of mass 
internal displacement of tens of millions of people. In 2016, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, South 
Sudan, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Nigeria were among the top 
countries with the biggest forcibly displaced populations in the world. In Syria alone, over half 
of the population was forced to live in displacement. At the same time, many other refugees 
opted for sanctuary in neighbouring countries, such as Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Egypt, Jordan 
and Turkey – with the latter country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world for 
several consecutive years.  
 
However, despite the majority of the refugees being considered internally displaced or opting for 
refuge in nearby countries, another large group of people decided to take the dangerous trip to 
Europe through the Central or Eastern Mediterranean routes. These events took place within 
what has been described as a worldwide refugee crisis, with official UNHCR data indicating that 
the number of forcibly displaced people at the end of 2016 numbered 65,600,000 – the highest 
since World War II. These numbers also included 2,8 million asylum seekers and represented a 
growth of 300 thousand over the previous year, indicating a global record high for the fifth 
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Within this framework is also how the peak of the European migrant crisis was reached during 
the years 2015-2016 and the EU was subsequently faced with many difficulties in its response. 
The Arab uprisings had a major impact on migration flows in Europe and affected primarily the 
Mediterranean borders, through which the vast majority of refugees from countries such as Syria 
or Libya entered the EU. In addition, this situation brought along a lot of complexities and issues 
that the international community still has not been able to overcome. Furthermore, the migrant 
“crisis” of 2015-2016 persists as one of the main points of disagreement within the EU, with no 
common holistic immigration and asylum policy in sight, as many member states attempt to 
apply their own practices under the umbrella of sovereignty. Ultimately, the combined pressure 
of border protection in addition to the maintenance of liberal European values and respect of 
human rights creates a complicated balance which has to be maintained by the EU institutions. 
This has led to common European policies which aim to reflect a humanitarian approach to the 
migrant and refugee influx, but have still received criticism from NGOs and human rights 
organisations for their ineffectiveness, which reflects a lack of political will to resolve the 
situation. Nonetheless, despite a lack of internal political agreement and organisational 
difficulties, the EU is still an independent system of institutional governance with a powerful 
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international position and policy-making powers that are binding for its Member States. 
Furthermore, the process of integration with shared rules and the openness of borders have 
always been at the heart of the European project. In light of this, it is important to examine the 
main common migration policies that were decided upon by the European institutions and which 
aimed at an effective response to the mass migration wave that hit Europe in recent years.  
 
 
2.2. EU Response Policies 
 
 
Early on in 2015, it was evident that Europe would be seeing an unprecedented number of 
refugees and migrants fleeing conflict, human rights violations and poverty in the Middle East 
and Africa. On 18 April 2015, there was a major shipwreck in the Mediterranean near the Libyan 
coast which resulted in the death of over 800 migrants, making it the deadliest shipwreck in the 
Mediterranean at the time.141 This massive tragedy turned the attention of Europeans to the 
humanitarian aspect of the issue and saving lives in the Mediterranean became a priority. The 
Times of Malta ran a powerful article on the inaction of European institutions with regards to the 
situation that expressed the general frustration felt within Europe – “Still, the EU dithers. 
Although the increasing magnitude of immigration is new, the problem itself has faced the EU 
for well over a decade. Efforts at solutions have been marked mostly by empty words of faux-
compassion in the face of the horrifying deaths in Europe’s own waters and have led to weak and 
politically unworkable plans”.142 Moreover, criticism was directed at the EU by the international 
community, urging it to respond with effective measures. More specifically, the UNHCR noted: 
“There needs to be a European-wide protection response to the recent tragedies which have 
claimed so many lives of migrants and refugees fleeing war, persecution and violence. This 
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response should be based on the fundamental European values of human rights, human dignity, 
solidarity, and respect for human life.”143  
 
The EU was thus faced with a difficult task and had to decide on specific solutions as fast as 
possible, despite the complexities of the migration issue. On 20 April 2015, an Extraordinary 
meeting of Foreign and Interior Ministers of the EU was held in Luxembourg in order to assess 
the situation and discuss potential actions. During this session, the Ministers discussed the 
migration situation in the EU following the recent incident in the Mediterranean. It was agreed to 
improve the fight against human trafficking, better coordinate EU actions to protect lives at sea 
and increase the support to countries that were severely hit by the refugee influx. Frederica 
Mogherini, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said at the 
meeting: “Today, we gave a strong EU reaction to the tragedies we have seen in the last few 
days. We need to act fast and act together”.144  
 
A Special Meeting of the European Council was then held on 23 April, where the Council’s 
President, Donald Tusk, stated: “Saving the lives of innocent people is, of course, the number 
one priority for us. But saving lives is not only about rescuing people at sea. It is also about 
fighting the smugglers and preventing illegal migration flows.”145 The main goals were to 
strengthen the EU’s presence at sea in order to avoid more tragedies, but to also discuss policies 
that would help to contain the migration pressure. The decisions taken at the meeting included 
actions directed at the improvement of EU sea operations, strengthening the fight against 
trafficking in accordance with international law, prevention of illegal migration flows and the 
reinforcement of EU’s internal responsibility and solidarity.146 Soon after – on 13 May, 2015, the 
European Agenda on Migration was adopted by the European Commission, presenting a detailed 
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response plan for the improvement of migration management. The plan focused on the following 
areas: reducing irregular migration, saving lives at sea, protecting the external EU borders as 
well as initiation of policies on asylum and legal migration.147 The shared responsibility of the 
EU Member States in the execution of this plan was also stressed. Following the adoption of the 
Agenda, on 27 May, 2015, it was also proposed by the Commission to organise an emergency 
relocation of 40,000 people from Greece and Italy to the other Member States, as well as to 
adopt a common action plan to counteract migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean.148 
 
The effectiveness of sea rescues was increased from this point forward, but the arrivals 
continued to rapidly increase as well, with the main influx also shifting from the Central to the 





Figure 4 – Monthly Irregular Arrivals 2015-2020 
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In 2015, over 885,000 border crossings were recorded through the Eastern route, with the 
majority of the refugees and migrants travelling from Turkey to the Aegean islands in Greece. 
This route change was mainly prompted by the additional transportation opportunities at the 
border between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, such as shuttling and 
busing services. The Eastern passage therefore became more accessible and attractive for people 
wishing to cross over to Northern and Western Europe through Turkey, then Greece and then the 
Balkans.149 
 
Additionally, the highly increased number of arrivals from that point forward was also a result of 
the Chancellor’s Angela Merkel’s announcement in late August, 2015 that Germany would 
override the Dublin Protocol and allow asylum-seekers to remain in Germany while their asylum 
claim is being processed, rather than returning them to the first contact state – in most cases 
Greece or Italy. As stated by Chancellor Merkel during her interview to the German public 
broadcast channel ZDF, “The issue of asylum could be the next major European project,” that 
would “preoccupy Europe much, much more than the issue of Greece and the stability of the 
euro”.150 Based on Germany’s decision, the country would be able to process Syrian asylum 
applications which would otherwise fall under the jurisdiction of another EU state. This made 
Germany the first country to officially suspend the Dublin Regulation drafted in the 1990s, 
which requires that all refugees must apply for asylum in the specific country through which 
they first entered Europe. Soon after, the Czech Republic followed suit and permitted Syrian 
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This was a significant change, since until then several European countries which represented 
desirable destinations for refuges and migrants, such as the United Kingdom, used the Dublin 
Regulation as a valid excuse to send the refugees away and prevent them from staying within 
their borders. Moreover, the strict application of the Dublin system would have meant that 
Greece and Italy would be left to crumble under the weight of the large numbers of arrivals they 
kept seeing since early 2015. This also came in addition to the pre-existing criticisms that the 
Dublin Regulation had received by the international community, with UNHCR stating in its 
2014 report on the implementation of the Dublin system: “The lack of clear guidance and 
common standards in aspects of the Dublin procedure, such as bias and the assessment of family 
links or dependence, has contributed to diverging practices and inadequate implementation. In 
practice, this has led to a lack of common understanding and hampers efficient cooperation 
between Member States. One key consequence is the failure of the Dublin system in its objective 
to ensure swift access to an asylum procedure”.152  
 
The German government’s decision had its critics that largely blamed it for the escalation of the 
migrant crisis. But in the existing context, it was a necessary decision given the alternative 
options. Already by that point many refugees and migrants arrived in Greece and then continued 
their trip through the Balkans to Hungary and then Austria in order to reach their main 
destination – Germany, which was the final station for them even before Merkel’s infamous 
“welcome”. Furthermore, 700,000 asylum applications had already been made in the EU 
between January and September 2015, which already represented a significant increase over the 
number of applications for the entire 2014. The situation further escalated in September 2015, 
when the Hungarian government presided by Viktor Orbán attempted to enforce the Dublin 
system by cutting off the access of refugees to Budapest’s railway station which connected 
Hungary and Austria by train. Tens of thousands of refugees were stranded outside the station in 
a makeshift camp, unable to leave. The German announcement that it was suspending the Dublin 
Regulation and the subsequent dialogue and agreement with Hungary and Austria allowed these 
people to obtain a clear path towards Germany. 153 This was a far better alternative than having 
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large numbers of refugees remain in severe living conditions in Hungary, with little to no chance 









As a result of these developments, a total of 1,255,640 applications for asylum were made in the 
EU by the end of 2015, which was more than double the numbers recorded in 2014.154 This is 
reflected in the above graph (Figure 5). 
 
Taking into account the aforementioned events, already starting from the summer of 2015 the 
EU had to work on a common solution that would further decrease the burden on the states in the 
front line of the migrant crisis, while also trying to reach agreement between Member States in 
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2.2.1. Quota System 
 
 
Given the unprecedented number of arrivals, the central issue for the EU now started to become 
the protection of outer borders to reduce irregular inflows and the effective management of the 
arriving groups of refugees and migrants. In order to ease the pressure on Greece, on the shores 
of which the vast majority of arrivals were observed – over 800,000 out of a million in 2015,155 
the EU attempted to negotiate a scheme according to which the refugees and migrants could be 
redistributed among member states. Based on existing EU regulations and more specifically the 
Dublin Agreement, asylum applications have to be processed by the country of their first entry 
into Europe. Within this framework, Greece along with Italy would have to deal with 
unmanageable numbers of asylum seekers, with little to no ability of proportionate management 
of the situation. Thus, in addition to the already made relocation proposal of 40,000 people from 
Greece and Italy to other Member States, the European Commission put forward additional 
suggestions regarding a relocation scheme based on certain quotas.  
 
A new set of actions were proposed on 9 September 2015, which included a relocation of an 
additional 120,000 refugees from countries directly impacted by the refugee crisis, as well as 
more tools of assistance for Member States. Then, on 14 September 2014, the previously 
discussed proposal of relocation for 40,000 refugees from Greece and Italy was finally adopted; 
three days later – on 22 September, the proposed relocation of 120,000 refugees was similarly 
approved as well by the Home Affairs Ministers. This decision represented a collective will to 
implement common solutions, which could be executed through the cooperation of EU agencies 
and Member States. As mentioned in the official statement of the European Commission, “The 
European Commission has been consistently and continuously working for a coordinated 
European response on the refugees and migration front. Relocation is part of a comprehensive 
approach to deal with the ongoing refugee crisis”. 156 Therefore, the EU had by that point 
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decided on the relocation of a total of 160,000 refugees primarily from Greece and Italy to other 
Member States and it was up for further discussion how exactly this would happen.  
 
Initially, a proposal was made by European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, to 
arrange the distribution of the 160,000 refugees among Member States based on a compulsory 
distribution system. Only the UK, Denmark and Ireland would be absolved from participation, as 
they had previously opted out from the European common asylum system. According to the 
suggestion, the allocation would be applicable for those "in clear need of international 
protection," with a rate of status recognition higher than 75% (for example, Syrians or Iraqis) 
and would also be decided per country based on “40% of the size of the population, 40% of the 
GDP, 10% of the average number of past asylum applications, 10% of the unemployment 
rate”.157 The mechanism would additionally come with a financial support of 780 million euros 
for the involved Member States. 
 
However, there was a disagreement among member states on whether these measures would be 
taken on voluntary or mandatory basis. This direction was rather anticipated and largely affected 
by national policies and views of different EU member states on immigration. In particular, 
Eastern European member states of the EU such as Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Poland and 
Czech Republic refused to take in any refugees based on the proposed quota system, thus 
denying the possibility of it becoming mandatory.158 The reasoning given by these countries was 
simply the fact that they had no experience with migrants and did not present an attractive 
destination for them, which was somewhat accurate since most migrants and refugees preferred 
to settle in Western European countries. That period also coincided with the widely released 
image of Aylan Kurdi – a 5-year old boy from the Syrian Arab Republic who was found 
deceased lying face down on the beach, giving major international attention to the European 
migrant crisis and especially the urgency and the humanitarian aspect of it. Being unable to reach 
a consensus on the distribution quotas and due to the critical nature of the situation, the European 
Commission opted to follow majority voting procedures for the proposed relocation scheme. The 
decision was thus put up for a vote according to the EU decision-making regulations and was 
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then adopted by qualified majority, which automatically made it an official EU law, binding for 
all Member States.  
 
The four countries of the Visegrad group – Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Czech Republic 
were strongly opposed to the decision and refused to take in any refugees based on quotas. 
Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico was quoted stating, "As long as I am prime minister, 
mandatory quotas will not be implemented on Slovak territory".159 Poland was among the 
countries who sided with the positive majority, while still opposing the quota system – “We are 
prepared to accept migrants but not quotas,” Poland's interior minister, Teresa Piotrowska, 
stated.160 Hungary, on the other hand, organised a national referendum in order to have its 
citizens decide on the application of the quota system. The majority voted “no,” as the 
government of Viktor Orbán had campaigned, but the results were hardly lawful from the 
perspective of the country’s obligations under EU law, which holds primacy over Member 
States’ national law. Hungary, along with Austria, Czech Republic and Poland were ultimately 
excluded from the relocation programme. Evidently, the situation underscored the divisions 
between Member States on the management of asylum claims, which by that point had turned 
into an existential issue for the European Union.  
 
Nonetheless, by the year 2019 approximately 63,000 people had been resettled since the 
adoption of the scheme in 2015.161 The progress of relocation procedures has been slow and 
lengthy, but commitments by Member States continue to be made for the resettlement of an 
additional number of 30,000 refugees for 2020.162 This indicates that despite delays and initial 
disagreements between Member States, decisions of EU institutes are met with commitment and 
the agreed migration policies see continuous implementation years after the start of the migrant 
crisis. As characteristically stated by Dimitris Avramopoulos – the EU Commissioner for 
 
159 Barigazzi, J. de La Baume, M. EU forces through refugee deal: Countries outvote Eastern European opponents of 
plan that relocates asylum-seekers [Electronic resource] / J. Barigazzi, J. M. de La Baume // POLITICO, 2015. 
URL: https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-tries-to-unblock-refugee-migrants-relocation-deal-crisis/ (accessed 
27.03.2020) 
160 Ibid. 
161 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: 
Progress report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration // European Commission, 2019. – P. 1. 
162 Delivering on Resettlement // European Commission, 2019. 
 57 
Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, during the Agenda on Migration progress report in 
October 2019: “Collectively, we have laid down the structural and operational foundations for a 
comprehensive European migration system that not only responds effectively and delivers 
results, but also promotes solidarity and responsibility. While there is still more work to do and 
the situation remains fragile, we are much better prepared than we were in 2015”.163 
 
 
2.2.2. EU-Turkey Deal 
 
 
In late 2015, it became clear that the EU would not be able to cope with the crisis without getting 
down the numbers of arrivals. On September 23, 2015, an Extraordinary Meeting of the 
European Council was held, where Donald Tusk – President of the European Council, stated: 
“We have now reached a critical point. Today, we are talking about millions of potential 
refugees trying to reach Europe. In light of this, the most urgent question is how to regain control 
of our external borders”.164 The accelerated influx numbers were becoming overbearing and 
significantly tested the EU’s reception capacity. Consequently, the next step was attempting to 
externalise border control and to implement common measures with neighbouring non-EU 
countries in order to prevent the increased number of arrivals in the first place. Since by that 
point the Eastern Mediterranean route presented the biggest influx of arrivals, Turkey was the 
country to initiate cooperation with. At the time, Turkey had already been carrying the weight of 
the Syrian conflict for several years, hosting almost 2,500,000 Syrian refugees within its 
territory, with many of those attempting to reach Europe from Turkish shores. Thus, the 
negotiations with Turkey began and on November 29, 2015, the Joint Action Plan on the 
Implementation of the EU-Turkey deal was adopted by the European Commission.165 
 
163 European Agenda on Migration four years on: Marked progress needs consolidating in face of volatile situation 
[Electronic resource] // European Commission. URL: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_6075 (accessed: 02.04.2020) 
164 Doorstep remarks by President Donald Tusk before the Informal meeting of Heads of state or government, 23 
September 2015 [Electronic resource] // Council of the European Union. URL: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/09/23/pec-tusk-doorstep/ (accessed: 27.03.2020) 
165 Meeting of the EU heads of state or government with Turkey, 29 November 2015 [Electronic resource] // 
Council of the European Union. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-
summit/2015/11/29/ (accessed: 02.04.2020) 
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Originally, the deal aimed at decreasing the influx of irregular migrants and refugees into Europe 
via the Greek islands. The main points of the agreement included: 
 
- potential accession negotiations of Turkey into the EU 
- visa liberalisation talks 
- joint action on ending human smuggling networks 
- cooperation with Greece and Bulgaria to counteract irregular migration to Europe 
- assistance from the EU for Syrian refugees located in Turkey 
- additional cooperation in other areas, such as energy and economy.166 
 
However, as numbers of arrivals to Greece via Turkey were not decreasing, it was evident that 
cooperation with Turkey had to be deepened. Negotiations were held at the highest level with the 
Turkish government and a new reinforced deal – the EU-Turkey Statement, was reached on 
March 18, 2016. The new goals included counteracting migrant smuggling in the Aegean Sea 
and decreasing the arrivals to Greek islands, as well as financial aid of 3 billion euros to help 
Turkey support Syrian migrants in its territory. Additionally, it was agreed to organise 
resettlement of each legal Syrian migrant in the EU in exchange for each Syrian returned back to 
Turkey, with capping at 72,000 exchanges. Furthermore, among the agreed points were: the 
return back to Turkey of all irregular migrants entering Greece after 20 March, 2016 and the 
emergency relocation of refugees awaiting asylum decisions in Greece in Italy to Turkey, in 
order to reduce the weight on the available resources of the latter two countries. 167 The 
reinforced cooperation produced the desirable results, significantly decreasing the refugee influx 
to Greek islands – more specifically, three weeks before the implementation of the Statement the 
arrivals to the Aegean islands numbered 26,878, while in the following three weeks they reached 
a total of 5,847.168 
 
 
166 EU-Turkey joint action plan [Electronic resource] // Council of the European Union. URL: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_15_5860 (accessed: 02.04.2020) 
167 EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016: Press Release 144/16 // Council of the European Union, 2016. 
168 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: First 
Report on the progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement // European Commission – 2016. – 
P. 7.  
 59 
The agreement with Turkey was hailed as a major success for Europe by EU officials, as after its 
implementation the numbers of arrivals dropped significantly. A report released in 2018 by the 
European Commission noted the significant decrease in arrivals – “showing clearly that the 
business model of smugglers exploiting migrants and refugees can be broken. Despite 
challenging circumstances, the first year of the EU-Turkey Statement has confirmed a steady 
delivery of tangible results”.169 More specifically, the total arrivals decreased from 1,032,408 in 
2015 to 373,652 in 2016,170 whereas the daily average decreased from 6,360 in October 2015 to 
80 in March 2016.171 Moreover, by February 2018, 12,476 Syrians had been resettled from 
Turkey to the EU and extended support had been provided to Greece in order to improve 
migration management and the work of registration centres, also known as hotspots. Assistance 
to Greece also included the funding of 1,3 billion euros.172 While underscoring the significantly 
positive results of the EU-Turkey deal, the same report released by the Commission additionally 
pointed out its shortcomings – most notably the slow pace of returns to Turkey from the Greek 
islands due to insufficient processing procedures and detention capacity in Greece. 
 
However, despite being called a success by EU officials, the EU-Turkey deal has since been 
criticised by many NGOs and human rights organisations as ineffective and irresponsible 
towards the rights of migrants and refugees. The biggest criticisms were directed at the slow 
procedures which saw small numbers of returns to Turkey – only 1,950 from the entry of the 
agreement into force on March 20, 2016 until October 31, 2019. Furthermore, irregular arrivals 
on Greek islands were once again on the rise in 2019 with 53,443 sea arrivals between January 
and November 2019. Most of these arrivals were from the island of Lesvos (23,591 total 
arrivals), the southeastern Aegean islands (12,693), as well as the island of Samos (9,774). These 
numbers are significantly increased compared to 2018 (32,494 total arrivals) and from 2017 
(29,718 total arrivals).173 The EU also claimed that its agreement with Turkey helped to reduce 
 
169 Daily News 17.03.2017 [Electronic resource] // Council of the European Union. URL: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEX_17_673 (accessed: 27.03.2020) 
170 Europe - Refugee and Migrant arrivals summary data // Operational Portal: Refugee Situations. United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2019. 
171 EU-Turkey statement: Two years on // European Commission, 2018. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Greece Sea Arrivals Dashboard - November 2019 // Operational Portal: Refugee Situations. United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 2019. 
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refugee and migration flows to European countries. This attitude has been considered 
problematic as it shows contempt for the right to asylum of non-European citizens which 
requires access to the territory of a Member State. In addition, the decrease in arrivals can also 
be attributed not only to the agreement itself specifically, but also to the successful closures of 
the borders of some Member States months before the adoption of the EU-Turkey deal. Hungary, 
Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia are all cases of either 
complete or partial border closures to refugees and migrants between 2015 and 2016, which 
made the Balkan route to Northern Europe less accessible and thus further discouraged arrivals 
to the Greek islands. 
 
On the other hand, despite the difficulties, EU remains committed to maintaining its deal with 
Turkey in the long run. While the Turkish government has used the refugee issue as a bargaining 
method and has recently distanced itself from the Western bloc approaching other international 
actors, such as Russia and Iran, it is still an important player in the EU neighbourhood and vital 
for the maintenance of European security. On the other hand, the EU seems unwilling to discuss 
any accession opportunities for Turkey in the near future, therefore it must maintain a complex 






Additional EU measures were directed at the strengthening of external borders – this time with 
the use of EU border control mechanisms. The existing EU mechanism responsible for 
coordination of border control efforts within the Schengen zone had been established in 2014 
under the name Frontex – the main European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders. In the aftermath of the migrant crisis, a common European 
Border Guard Agency was proposed by the European Commission on December 15, 2015, 
which extended the mandate of Frontex into a full-scale European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency. The proposal included more powers and staff, rapid-response teams and enhanced 
supervision of external borders. The main objectives of Frontex include protection of EU’s 
 
174 Nas, Ç. The EU's Approach to the Syrian Crisis: Turkey as a Partner? / Ç. Nas // Uluslararası İlişkiler-
International Relations. – 2019. Vol. 16, №. 62. – P. 64. 
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external borders against illegal immigration and human trafficking, as well as the coordination of 
operations to save human lives at sea. 
 
A further expansion of Frontex and its capabilities occurred in December 2019, when it was 
announced that it would be acquiring “new responsibilities and tools to more effectively support 
EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries in managing their external borders to 
provide a high level of security for all their citizens”.175 The new regulation, which has already 
entered into force, paves the way for the creation of the European Union's first intelligence 
service. By 2027, it is estimated that Frontex will be able to rely on a force of 10,000 border 
guards positioned on land and sea, in order to be able to assist the national authorities of each 
Member State in controlling the external borders and in migration management. This new 
manpower will not be a military army, as stated by Fabrice Leggeri, Frontex's executive director, 
"but we will have, let's say, civilian troops wearing a European uniform. And for certain 
functions carrying weapons".176 Furthermore, despite decreasing numbers of migrant and refugee 
arrivals, Frontex’s budget has been steadily increasing, from 86 million euros in 2013 to 254 
million in 2016. Strengthening Frontex signifies the new European Commission's determination 
to reach an agreement on migration within the EU, as Member States debate the most 
fundamental issue: should migrants and asylum seekers be redistributed across the EU or remain 
in the first country of their arrival? At present, all Member States only seem to agree that the 
EU’s external borders must be protected. This is evident by the continued strengthening of the 
role of Frontex, which rose from the total manpower of 750 under the previous Commission’s 
leadership, to the forecasted 10,000. Nonetheless, the main protection of the EU borders will still 
be under the supervision of national border guards, which shall number ten times the manpower 
of Frontex – 115,000 in total.177 But with an increased manpower and a budget of 340 million 
 
175 News Release: New Frontex Regulation Comes into Force [Electronic resource] // Frontex: European Border and 
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euros, Frontex will indeed have significant duties, which will include conducting border controls 
along with national services and with the consent of the Member State in whose territory it will 
be operating. Frontex services will further focus on improving returns, which means returning 
asylum seekers who did not receive a positive response or redistributing them to third countries 
willing to accept them. Presently, less than half of refugees and asylum seekers with failed 
claims actually leave European territory. The solution, as envisioned by Frontex's leadership, is 
to speed up decisions at national level. Then, Frontex will be able to take over mainly at the level 
of logistics (arrangements with airlines for the return of migrants, etc.) 
 
At the same time, Frontex’s evolution has progressed amidst frequent criticism from different 
directions, including Member States and various humanitarian NGOs. On the one hand, Frontex 
has been accused of attempting to create a “Fortress Europe” and showing no concern for the 
suffering of refugees, while on the other hand, there have been accusations that it does not 
protect the EU’s external borders effectively and that national border protection services are 
preferable. In the first occasion, Frontex has been said to violate international refugee law with 
its border closure operations and strict controls, which sometimes see refugees sent back to their 
countries. This reinforces the view that Frontex represents the EU’s first paramilitary force, 
which, while beginning as simple coast guard service, has seen its powers steadily increase. 
Concerns have been voiced against lack of transparency in Frontex’s operations, as well as 
democratic oversight over them. Moreover, human rights organsations such as Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) have criticised Frontex of ineffective work in the Mediterranean Sea, where 
the clash between protection of EU borders and protection of refugee lives creates significant 
conflicts of interest between various organisations operating in the region. For instance, Frontex 
had accused MSF of indirectly helping out smugglers in the Central Mediterranean, but refused 
to share the internal report that these accusations were based on when MSF requested it. 
Subsequently, MSF’s Coordinator of the Forced Migration team, Aurélie Ponthieu. published a 
response to Frontex’s accusations, pointing out the increased death toll in the Mediterranean in 
2016, despite the EU search and rescue operations, as well as criticised the implication of 
Frontex that the suggested alternative for MSF would be to “let people drown as a strategy to 
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deter the smugglers”.178 From the opposite end, Member States have accused Frontex of 
intervening in areas where national services should be the sole operating force. For instance, 
Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban has stated that the strengthening of Frontex will “strip 
Hungary of its right to protect its own borders.”179 Though, such criticisms have been addressed 
by the European Commission, which stated that the EU does not intend to take over border 
control from Member States, but rather to assist them in their operations and with their consent.  
 
Overall – as seen in this chapter, despite problems and criticisms, the EU maintains commitment 
to its immigration policies. Moreover, the backstory for the 2015-16 European migrant crisis 
provided in this chapter illustrated the complex conditions under which the EU found itself. The 
subsequent collective measures decided by the EU institutions to face the crisis included the 
relocation scheme – also known as the quota system, the agreement with Turkey, and the 
reinforcement of the role of Frontex – the European Border and Coast Guard. The agreement of 
these policies occurred in a state of urgency and as the international community observed the 
events, while migrant and refugee influx in Europe crossed the one-million mark. Consequently, 
this was a major test for the European Project – not only in the collective capability for quick 
decisive action, but even more so in the capacity of adopting effective common solutions that 
would correspond with EU humanitarian values. The implementation of the adopted policies 
indicated varying levels of success and they were often met with disagreements between 
Member States. Nonetheless, all three policy areas still remain on the main EU agenda and 
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3.1. Quota System 
 
 
As mentioned in the introductory part of this research, both qualitative and quantitative methods 
are applied for the present analysis. A specified security lexicon proposed by Baele and Sterck in 
their research (it can be found in the Appendix) is used to analyse 50 texts focused on each of the 
chosen immigration policy areas of the EU. The security ratio is then calculated by dividing the 
total times each of the words in the security lexicon was encountered in the analysed texts, over 
the total number of words in the texts. The “low” security ratio and the “high” security ratio 
provided by Baele and Sterck for comparison is 1,26 and 5,27 respectively. The level of security 
language in the first one is low, since the sample under analysis was taken from generic EU 
policy texts, and in the second one it is very high, due to the sample having been taken from hard 
security policies. These ratios will constitute the comparison levels in the present research as 
well. Thus, if another sample shows a security ratio above 1,26 – this will indicate an increased 
level of securitisation. 
 
The first policy area under consideration is the relocation and resettlement scheme of the EU, 
commonly known as the so-called “Quota system”. It was introduced by the European 
Commission in order to organise the relocation of 120,000 refugees from Greece, Italy and 
Hungary to other EU states. This proposal was approved by the European Parliament on 
September 17, 2015. This policy area was among the very first collective EU response measures 
to the 2015-16 migration crisis in Europe. 
 
In order to calculate the security ratio for the EU’s Quota system, 50 texts of official EU 
institutes were analysed – speeches, press releases, factsheets, laws, resolutions. The documents 
in the sample were chosen to include both representations of discourse as well as official 
policies, in order to analyse both the rhetoric and the subsequent actions of EU institutions. The 
majority of the texts were composed and published by the European Commission and European 
Council. Overall, the chosen sample included a total of 291,625 words. After the automated 
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check of this sample against the security lexicon through the use of the software MEH (Meaning 
Extraction Helper), the result indicated 8,857 occurrences of the specified “security words” in 
the provided documents. As a result, the proportion of these words over the total amount in the 
sample provides a security ratio of 3,04 – which is significantly higher than the “low” security 
ratio of 1,26 calculated by Baele and Sterck in their research. Consequently, this indicates an 
increased use of security language in the discourse and the subsequent policies centred around 
the EU’s Quota system. Therefore, given these numbers, we can estimate that there is a higher 
level of securitisation in immigration policies focused on the EU Quota system than in generic 





Figure 6 – Quota system security ratio 
Source: Quota system – author’s original research data; Low and high security ratio – Baele and Sterck’s 
2014 research 
 
As evident in the above table (Figure 6), the Quota system security ratio is more than twice as 
high as the “low security” ratio. It is also more than half of the “high security” ratio – which 
illustrates an above average level in the use of security language, since the latter ratio represents 
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hard security policies that traditionally contain the highest level of security language. Given the 
fact that the Quota system scheme is centred around migration management and is not part of the 
traditional security sphere in the EU, this level of security language is abnormally high. 
Consequently, we can conclude that the EU’s Quota system policies illustrate that migration in 
the EU has been securitised. 
 
 
Word Frequency Observation Percentage 
state 3657 98 
protection 1042 96 
authority 448 72 
security 351 72 
emergency 294 72 
lebanon 293 44 
crisis 278 64 
cooperation 258 72 
target 201 54 
response 184 70 
force 160 50 
law 153 46 
control 113 36 
syria 100 50 
iraq 83 44 
police 77 34 
close 76 64 
fundamental 71 34 
power 53 32 
safe 48 34 
 
Table 1 – Quota system top 20 security words 
Source: Author’s original research 
 
 
Furthermore, the analysis of the list of “security words” most encountered in the texts (as seen in 
Table 1) is also indicative of a high level of securitisation. For the analysed texts, the MEH 
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software provided a set of words from the security lexicon that were encountered in the total 
amount of words and indicated the value of “frequency” – the total number of times each word 
appeared in the reviewed documents, and “observation percentage” – the total percentage of all 
documents where each word appeared. For instance, the top word as seen in the below table is 
“state”, which was encountered 3,657 times and appeared in 98 percent of all the analysed 
documents. 
 
The frequent use of the word “state” in the context of the analysed texts in the vast majority of 
cases refers to “Member State” – the countries which compose the European Union. In the 
context of the securitisation theory model, the EU policy-making institutions such as the 
European Council, European Commission and European Parliament represent the securitising 
actor, while the Member States represent the audience which accepts the securitising move. In 
the case of the Quota system policies, while some Member States have objected their 
application, the majority was in favour of it – a level of acceptance sufficient for a successful 
securitising move. 
 
Furthermore, in the above table we can also observe that words such as “emergency” and “crisis” 
are among the most used in the analysed texts and are encountered in 72 and 64 percent of total 
texts respectively. As supported by Buzan et al., securitisation occurs when an issue is taken 
from the area of normal politics to emergency politics – “when a securitising actor uses a 
rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is 
‘normal politics,’ we have a case of securitisation”.180 They also point out that “the 
distinguishing feature of securitisation is a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of 
action because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to 
remedy our failure)”.181 The language of panic and unease is thus one of the first instruments to 
start the process of a securitising move. Additionally, the proposed Quota system policies were 
among the first response measures in the EU when the migrant crisis took place in 2015-16 – this 
coincided with the higher securitisation of the migration issue when it started being treated as a 
topic of extreme importance for the entire European Union. Emergency politics were the 
 
180 Buzan, B. Wæver, O. de Wilde, J. H. Security: A New Framework for Analysis / B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. H. de 
Wilde. – London: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998. – P. 24. 
181 Ibid. – P. 26. 
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subsequent response, with the Quota system proposals and subsequent policy decisions being the 
first indications of this move of the migration theme to the security realm. The word “response” 
observed in 70 percent of all texts is indicative of this tendency. 
 
As the table also indicates, words such as “security” and “police” were encountered in 72 and 34 
percent of all documents respectively. The use of this type of language is most indicative of a 
security rhetoric in the EU’s Quota system migration policies. For instance, the First report on 
relocation and resettlement, published in 2016, underscored the importance of conducting 
security checks during relocation procedures. The assistance to the Hellenic Police in refugee 
facility management was also underlined.182 This indicates a prioritisation of security concerns 
by the EU within the scope of migration management. For instance, the document containing the 
Proposal for a Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international 
protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece speaks of “general provisions on the Asylum, 
Migration and Integration Fund and on the instrument for financial support for police 
cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and crisis management”.183 The mention of issues 
such as police and crime in line with asylum and migration indicates increased security concerns 
in relation to migration management. 
 
Finally, the fact that these security-themed words were encountered repeatedly in the analysed 
texts is indicative of intended securitisation practices. According to Baele and Sterck, the 
intensity of repetition of security themes indicates a continuum of securitisation moves.184 Thus, 
we can state that all the main characteristics of a successful securitising move are present in the 
Quota system policies and based on the above analysis and data, the EU Quota system migration 
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report on relocation and resettlement // European Commission, 2016. 
183 Proposal for a Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the 
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3.2. EU-Turkey Deal 
 
 
The next policy area that was examined in the scope of the present research is the EU-Turkey 
agreement, which was concluded in two stages in 2016 – from the Joint Action Plan of October, 
2015, to the final Statement of March 2016. 
 
The analysis was once again conducted on 50 texts, this time pertaining to the EU-Turkey 
dialogue and the subsequent agreements on migration management, as the second large policy 
area in response to the migrant crisis of 2015-16. In summary, this cooperation package aimed at 
a refugee exchange plan between EU and Turkey in order to ease the migrant inflow pressure on 
European borders. Turkey would host a Syrian refugee camp and offer the opportunity for 
asylum application without crossing EU borders, while all irregular migrants encountered in 
Europe would be sent back to Turkey. In exchange, the EU would offer Turkey financial 
assistance and a set of other concessions, such as potential visa facilitation and even EU 
accession talks. The deal has been called a success because it reduced migrant inflows by 97% 
compared to 2015. But this comparison was made against a year when Germany’s borders were 
open and 1.5 million refugees passed through Greece – something that seems impossible today.  
 
In order to determine whether this policy area has been securitised, a bulk of documents which 
included official press releases, speeches, factsheets, resolutions, agreements and annexes of EU 
institutions focused on the cooperation with Turkey was reviewed. The chosen sample amounted 
in a total of 194,025 words, while the number of words present in the security lexicon totalled in 
5,501 words. By dividing the number of “security words” over the total number of words in the 
examined sample, the result shows a security ratio of 2,84. Comparing this ratio with the samples 
of “low” and “high” security ratios provided by Baele and Sterck – 1,26 and 5,27 respectively, 
we can conclude that the policy area of the EU-Turkey cooperation presents a significantly 
higher level of security language than a generic EU policy area. This result can also be reflected 
in the below graph (Figure 7). Therefore, the securitisation of migration within the EU-Turkey 






Figure 7 – EU-Turkey deal security ratio 




Furthermore, moving on to the results of the analysis word-by-word (as seen in Table 2), we can 
see that the concentration of security-themed terms is once again very high and indicative of a 
securitising move. Words in the below table, such as “crisis”, “emergency” and “response” 
underscore the urgency of the situation and illustrate the extraordinary nature of the measures 
taken under the umbrella of the EU-Turkey cooperation on migration management. This goes in 
line with securitisation practices, which require an urgent security rhetoric in order to include an 
area of normal politics in the traditional security sphere. Indeed, were it not for the pertaining 
extraordinary circumstances, such an agreement between the EU and Turkey would seem highly 
unlikely. This is especially evident given Turkey’s democratic deficit and the generally negative 
public opinion about Turkey within the EU, with 76% of Europeans being against Turkish 
membership in the Union.185 But the necessity of an effective response urged European 
authorities to seek cooperation with neighbouring states – most importantly Turkey, the country 
 
185 Lindgaard, J. EU Public Opinion on Turkish EU Membership: Trends and Drivers / J. Lindgaard // FEUTURE. – 
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which hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees in the world. The frequent use of the word 
“cooperation”, which was present in 88 percent of all examined texts underlines this necessity of 
common actions of the Member States and EU agencies in partnership with the Turkish side. For 
instance, the EU-Turkey Statement progress report of September, 2016, underlines that 
“cooperation needs to be deepened to optimise the use of intelligence by all EU, NATO, Greek 
and Turkish authorities”.186 
 
 
Word Frequency Observation Percentage 
state 1072 90 
protection 562 84 
authority 490 86 
cooperation 282 88 
crisis 276 76 
syria 258 68 
emergency 241 56 
security 208 64 
law 171 70 
response 166 54 
police 148 50 
target 138 48 
force 116 58 
close 100 62 
safe 90 62 
strategy 71 38 
intervention 71 26 
fundamental 60 40 
fight 58 48 
control 51 44 
 
Table 2 – EU-Turkey deal top 20 security words 




186 Managing the Refugee Crisis, EU-Turkey Statement: Progress Report September 2016 // European Commission, 
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Next, the high frequency of the words “security” and “police” – which appeared in 64 and 50 
percent of all texts respectively, illustrates the importance of the security narrative for the 
cooperation between the EU and Turkey in migration management. The primary goal within this 
sphere is the counteraction of illegal migration and the work of smugglers. The appearance of the 
words such as “illegal”, “crime” and “defence” in over 20 percent of all the texts also points out 
the importance of security themes within the scope of this cooperation.  
 
Furthermore, the increased use of the word “Syria”, which was encountered in 68 percent of all 
documents, indicates the significance of the Syrian conflict as a major driver for the European 
migrant crisis and by extension drives the necessity for an approach with Turkey. Since the 
country hosts a large number of Syrian refugees, it is the primary goal of the EU to find common 
solutions with the Turkish side. As stated in the EU Monitoring Report on the Facility for 
Refugees in Turkey, “for the past 8 years since the onset of the Syrian civil war, Turkey has been 
the major reception and transit country for refugees from Syria and other countries in the region, 
becoming by 2015, the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world.”187 
Therefore, both the urgency and the unique necessity to cooperate with Turkey as extraordinary 
measures of migration crisis management are underscored.  
 
The above analysis thus makes it evident that the EU-Turkey migration management policy area 
also presents the main characteristics of a securitising move. It also shows high levels of 
securitisation, in comparison with other areas of EU policies not encountered in the traditional 






The last EU migration policy area under consideration is the European Border and Coast Guard, 
commonly known as Frontex. The agency is responsible for coordinating and maintaining border 
controls within Europe’s Schengen Area in cooperation with the EU Member States’ own border 




the role of Frontex was significantly reinforced starting from European Commission’s proposal 
in December 2015. The expansion of the authorities of Frontex is a continuing process, which is 
still taking place – with a new package of proposals, including a significant budget and staff 
increase scheduled for 2020. 
 
In order to examine securitisation levels in this third policy area, 50 more relevant texts were 
analysed with the help of the MEH software. The documents under examination included official 
press releases, factsheets, laws, resolutions of EU institutions, including Frontex’s own 
publications, available on the agency’s official website. The chosen sample consisted of a total 
of 537,827 words, while the number of words present in the security lexicon amounted in 18,100 
occurrences. As a result, by dividing the latter number over the total amount of words contained 
in the documents, this offers us a security ratio of 3,37. In the same way as in the cases analysed 
above, we compare this ratio with Baele and Sterck’s sample ratios of low and high security – 
1,26 and 5,27 respectively. As evident in the below graph (Figure 8), the ratio pertaining to the 




Figure 8 – Frontex security ratio 
Source: Frontex security ratio – author’s original research data; Low and high security ratio – Baele and 
Sterck’s 2014 research 
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Frontex’s security ratio is also increased compared to the ones observed in the previously 
examined policies – it is higher than the 3,04 ratio of the Quota system and the 2,84 ratio of the 
EU-Turkey deal. This can be explained by the fact that Frontex is a border guard agency and part 
of the EU intelligence services, thus having more connection to the traditional security sphere. 
Nonetheless, it is still an agency heavily focused on migration management and has been a 
significant part of the EU’s package of immigration policies and must therefore be examined as 
one of them. At the same time, it must be noted that all three policy areas under examination 
present ratios that are relatively close to one another and significantly higher than the “low” 
security sample – which indicates an intense presence of security language in these policy areas, 
subsequently deeming them securitised. 
 
Moving on to the word analysis part (as seen below in Table 3), the frequency of specific words 
in the analysed documents is also indicative of a high level of securitisation. Firstly, the 
importance of Frontex as an emergency intervention authority that assists Member States with 
migration management is signified by the frequent usage of words such as “intervention”, 
“strategic”, “response” and “capability”. To provide context, one of the analysed documents – 
the 2015 European Agenda on Migration, states: “Any Member State facing a situation of urgent 
and exceptional pressure due to large number of migrants trying to enter the territory illegally, 
which exceeds the capacity of the Member State concerned may trigger a rapid intervention 
coordinated by Frontex.”188  
 
Next, the word “protection”, which was mentioned in 72 percent of all documents, in the present 
context references the protection of European external borders in the majority of cases – it is 
evidently prioritised to the protection of migrants and asylum seekers. Importance is given to the 
preservation of the Schengen area and effectiveness of border controls, as well as cooperation of 
Frontex with Member States’ national guards to serve this purpose. This context is apparent in 
one of the examined documents – the European Commission Proposal of 2018, which aimed at 
the establishment of a significantly reinforced role for Frontex and would enable it to “act as a 
genuine border police to ensure the protection of EU external borders, to effectively manage 
 
188 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: 
Progress report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration // European Commission, 2015. 
 75 
migratory flows and to contribute to guarantee a high level of security within the Union - a key 
condition to preserve the Schengen area”.189 Similarly, the reinforced role of Frontex is 
underlined with the use of the word “police” – essentially giving the agency migration policing 
powers similar to law enforcement. 
 
 
Word Frequency Observation Percentage 
state 3735 92 
cooperation 1953 78 
control 1034 84 
fundamental 929 64 
security 862 86 
authority 846 74 
protection 595 72 
strategy 526 42 
capability 519 40 
intervention 495 58 
law 482 62 
strategic 477 38 
surveillance 441 62 
crime 381 56 
response 331 48 
power 304 48 
target 286 46 
force 285 66 
intelligence 263 32 
threat 251 54 
 
Table 3 – Frontex top 20 security words 
Source: Author’s original research 
 
 
A notable mention is also the usage of the word “threat”. While it is not directly referenced to 
migrants themselves, the context of its use clearly touches hard security themes. For instance, in 
the same document mentioned above – the 2018 European Commission Proposal on the 
 
189 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast 
Guard // European Commission, 2018. 
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reinforced role of Frontex, “threat” is indicated in the following context: “The Agency will 
develop new types of inter-agency cooperation with the authorities of the aviation sector to better 
detect and respond to the new threats induced by aircrafts and drones.”190 This further 
emphasises the significantly expanded functions of Frontex, which resemble those of a 
militarised law enforcement agency. In fact, the new role of Frontex has been looked at in the 
exact same way by the international community, with the agency’s chief, Fabrice Leggeri, 
stating to EUobserver that he “would not object if you define us as a law enforcement agency at 
EU level”.191 Thus, the line between Frontex and police is seen as blurring across the EU and the 
initial focus on migration has taken a turn towards issues such as terrorism, drug smuggling and 
document fraud, among others. 
 
This can be supported by an even earlier research published by Aas and Gundhus in the British 
Journal of Criminology, which aimed at examining the discrepancy between the humanitarian 
values present in border guard practices and the actual policing practices. By conducting 
interviews with Frontex officials and examining the agency’s official policy documents, the 
researchers concluded that there is an evident incoherence between the performative attention to 
human rights and the real practices, which prioritise security objectives. Consequently, the 
importance of Frontex as the vital line in “fending off migration pressures at Europe’s doorstep” 
represents a telling observation of the realpolitik behind the agency’s growing set of 
authorities.192 
 
Therefore, it is evident in the policies centred on the role of Frontex in the EU that security 
themes take significant priority and the agency’s authority is primarily that of protecting 
European borders against any irregular activity – including migrants. Therefore, it can be 





191 Nielsen, N. Frontex: Europe's new law enforcement agency? [Electronic resource] / N. Nielsen // EUobserver, 
2018. URL:  https://euobserver.com/justice/141062 (accessed: 20.05.2020) 
192 Aas, K. F., Gundhus, H. O. I.  Policing Humanitarian Borderlands: Frontex, Human Rights and the 
Precariousness of Life / K. F. Aas, H. O. I. Gundhus // The British Journal of Criminology. – 2015. Vol. 55, №. 1. – 
P. 15. 
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3.4. Criticism: Human Rights Perspective 
 
 
Lastly, it is necessary to evaluate the human rights aspect of the EU’s immigration policies 
analysed in the previous sections. As evidenced by the securitisation theory scholars, it is an 
important part of the research process, since it takes into account the issue of ethics. 
Furthermore, as an independent international actor, the EU has specific humanitarian values and 
human rights obligations according to the international law, as well as its own treaties. 
Therefore, it is important to examine whether these values and obligations correlate with the 
immigration policies of the EU institutes. This evaluation will provide a more complete picture 
within the framework of the present research and offer a final word to relevant scholars, as well 
as international organisations, such as human rights NGOs. 
 
Firstly, it is required to answer the following question: What are the EU’s human rights 
obligations and pertaining values? Many human rights treaties have been ratified by the 
European Union – both international and European. This includes such important treaties, such 
as the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, the 
1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR), as well as the 2009 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Therefore, 
the EU has demonstrated its commitment to upholding and defending the basic human rights 
values preserved in the aforementioned treaties. Furthermore, the EU has always underscored the 
importance of such values, as indicated in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union: “The 
Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. 
These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”193 
The EU also has other instruments in place to ensure the preservation of fundamental rights. 
More specifically, when new legislative initiatives are proposed, the European Commission must 
provide an assessment of their compatibility with fundamental rights, which is later examined 
also by the European Council and Parliament. The latter institution also produces an annual 
report on the overall situation of fundamental rights protection within the EU. Moreover, since 
 
193 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union of 26 October, 2012 // Official Journal of the European 
Union. – 2012. Title 1: Common Provisions. Article 2. 
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2014, an annual dialogue is organised with Member States in the EU Council to discuss various 
subjects pertaining to legal protections of human rights.194  
 
It is therefore evident that the EU has an extensive basis for human rights protections and 
humanitarian values are embedded in its very formation and decision-making process. Indeed, 
the EU has in place an elaborate asylum mechanism which includes the European Asylum 
Directive and Asylum Support Office. Nonetheless, these achievements contradict with 
European refugee and asylum practices – with access to borders and asylum application 
processes becoming more and more difficult for those that may qualify. European institutions 
have thus faced extensive criticism for their lack of efficiency in the implementation of 
immigration policies post-2015. The EU has attempted to balance both security and human 
rights, with insufficient results – an indication of an apparent institutional weakness in crisis 
response. Tsoukala points out that the constant reinforcement and establishment of border and 
immigration controls, the worsening of conditions of entry and deportation measures, as well as 
the reinforced cooperation with third countries (such as Turkey) have resulted in the weakening 
of the asylum seekers’ legal status in the EU. She goes on to point out the contradictions in such 
immigration policies – while security agencies and official authorities note the effectiveness of 
their border protections, the reported numbers of illegal migrants are still extremely high.195 This 
situation reflects a multitude of issues within the EU’s immigration policy in terms of its 
efficiency and the aspect of human rights.  
 
Most notoriously, the EU-Turkey agreement was hailed as a success by the European side, but 
was met with critique by the majority of international community. The Greek National 
Commission for Human Rights (ECHR) – an independent advisory body to the Greek state on 
human rights issues, stated in a 2016 report that the agreement was without a doubt a major 
European double back on human rights issues. It also pointed out that the provision that only 
Syrians would be accepted as refugees in the EU as well as the agreement on the maximum 
number of refugees to settle in the EU constituted a direct violation of the 1951 Geneva 
 
194 The protection of fundamental rights in the EU [Electronic resource] // European Parliament. URL: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/146/the-protection-of-fundamental-rights-in-the-eu (accessed: 
28.04.2020) 
195 Tsoukala, A. Looking at Migrants as Enemies / A. Tsoukala // Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and 
Within Europe / ed.: Bigo, D, Guild, E. – London: Routledge, 2017. – P. 161. 
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Convention.196 Then, Amnesty International considers that the EU-Turkey agreement is a 
“shameful stain on the collective conscience of Europe”.197 It also published a report which 
demonstrated that the Turkish asylum system does not meet the three crucial criteria required by 
international law for the legal return of asylum-seekers in Turkey: status, sustainable solutions 
and livelihoods. According to the report, Turkey has been known to deport people to Syria and 
Afghanistan between 2014-2018 despite provisions of international human rights law to refrain 
from deportations to places where people could face a serious risk of human rights violations, 
such as persecution, torture and other dangers. Turkey, however, denies its illegal practices and 
claims that all Syrians that have been returned to their home country have done so voluntarily.198 
This situation is also made worse by Turkey’s own involvement in military operations in Syria. 
More specifically, Turkish attempts to create a “safe zone” in the north-eastern part of Syria, 
which involved military attacks on Kurdish-led armed groups in the region, provoked violations 
of civilians’ human rights and war crimes. As reported by Amnesty International, these 
operations resulted in the displacement of more than 160,000 people in just a week’s time. But in 
case these military actions had been openly criticised by the European Union, Turkish President 
Erdoğan essentially threatened the EU that he would open the borders and send over 3 million 
Syrian refugees to Europe from Turkey.199 It is also characteristic, that the quality and quantity 
of migrant inflows to Greece seem to depend on the disposition of the Turkish authorities and the 
state of their relations with Europe. Greek authorities have claimed that economic migrants, who 
are now the majority of arrivals from Turkey, are more difficult to manage and are knowingly 
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sent to Europe by the Turkish side.200 In March, 2020, President Erdoğan once again threatened 
to stop enforcing the 2016 deal and send millions of migrants to the EU, while the Greek 
authorities stated that Turkey had turned itself into a “trafficker” and “this relocation of people 
has nothing to do with international law regarding the right of asylum”.201 This intimidation 
technique employed by Turkey represented a weakened position of the EU and added to its 
criticism by the international community – especially since the EU is still committed to the 2016 
agreement with Turkey.  
 
Furthermore, the EU’s cooperation with Turkey despite the latter’s contradictive attitudes 
towards Syrians along with historically lacking implementation of international human rights 
law indicate that European authorities prioritise security of borders against migrants and leave 
the humanitarian aspects of such a partnership further in the background. This also adds to the 
fact that the EU-Turkey deal has been deemed as ineffective in terms of the returns to Turkey, 
which are made difficult by bureaucracy and procedural delays, while migrants have to wait for 
their claims to be processed in overcrowded camps, oftentimes with squalid conditions. Lastly, 
the decreased arrivals to Greece since the Turkey agreement do not necessarily indicate success. 
Instead of being discouraged to cross over to Europe, Syrians opt for new passages that are 
longer, more expensive and more dangerous. They can cross over to Egypt and travel to Italy 
instead of Greece and the statistics for the Central Mediterranean Route right after the signing of 
the Turkey deal indicated a significant increase in arrivals – a consequence of the deal’s 
implementation, according to the UNHCR.202 At the same time, the International Organisation 
for Migration (IOM) reported in February, 2017 that 1 in every 23 migrants attempting to travel 
on the Central Mediterranean Route within the first several months of 2016 had died.203 
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A similar situation that is evident in the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement can also be 
observed in other European immigration policies. For instance, Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
connects the EU’s cooperation with Libya to abuse of migrants in Libyan detention centres. 
Based on HRW’s report, European authorities provide assistance to the Libyan Coast Guard in 
intercepting asylum seekers and migrants at sea, right after they sail off the Libyan coast. After 
that, they are taken to detention, where they are held in terrible conditions with risk of human 
rights abuses. Per the claims of the EU Commissioner on Migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos, the 
EU is aware of this, but based on on-site interviews which HRW conducted with detainees, the 
impact of European efforts to improve conditions in the detention centres have been 
insufficient.204 Another example is a study conducted by Migreurop at the request of the Green 
group in the European Parliament, which questioned the guarantees of human rights provided by 
Frontex, especially in light of the revision of its mandate that gave the agency more authority 
and policing powers. The research found a large gap between “text and reality” – the attention 
given to human rights protections on paper, but the absence of their implementation in 
practice.205 
 
Further examining the situation, the problem of the human rights dimension of EU immigration 
policies remains a general issue. According to Klug, the EU preliminary debates on the 2015 
migration crisis focused more on burden-sharing between Member States and less on the 
dimension of human rights.206 The major sources of migrant inflows – the Syrian conflict and the 
political instability in the Middle East and North Africa, are ongoing issues that indicate that 
migration and refugee flows will not cease in the next years. Völkel points out that since most of 
the decisions on EU immigration policy take place in the Justice and Home Affairs Council, 
which is composed of justice and interior ministers of Member States, the securitisation of 
migration is a natural development and the humanitarian aspect of the issue is overshadowed by 
security concerns, such as criminal and terrorist networks, as well as formation of refugee 
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trails.207 He suggests that restrictive immigration policies will not be able to put a stop to 
irregular migration in the EU and will not increase internal security.208 Moreover, according to 
Vaughan-Williams, there is a discrepancy between the “EU Commission’s neo-liberal 
humanitarian policy rhetoric and the violent reality of many irregular migrant’s embodied 
experiences of their encounter with attempts to police their mobility”.209 The irregular migrant is 
seen as both as someone to be protected and to protect against – creating a discrepancy between 
the rhetoric of humanitarianism and the reality of securitisation practices.  
 
As indicated in this chapter, immigration policies in the EU have been securitised. The 
conducted analysis shows that security themes are prioritised in European discourse and 
subsequent policies, while the human rights aspect – although present in writing, is 
underrepresented in practice. This indicates a situation where the EU attempts to balance 
between two camps – the one of border security and the other of humanitarianism. This division 
illustrates the EU’s institutional weakness in collective decision-making process – an issue that 
must be overcome, should the EU wish to implement a more effective immigration policy. Given 
the above criticism, besides the established border controls and agreements with third countries it 
will be important for the EU to correctly prioritise the safety of individuals – safe transit routes, 
facilitated integration process, better access to legal status both for asylum seekers and economic 
migrants. It will also be vital to implement improved procedures in these areas in coordination 
with Member States, especially when it comes to refugees and asylum seekers – an area where 
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As seen in this research paper, the European migrant crisis of 2015-16 has overtaken the socio-
political dialogue in Europe since its very beginning and has replaced economic themes, which 
had remained prioritised after the 2008 global financial crisis. The unprecedented influx of 
migrants and refugees to Europe, which was provoked by the events known as the Arab Spring – 
and especially the Libyan civil war and the Syrian conflict, was a major turning point for the 
EU’s migration policies. Since 2015, several new policy areas were introduced as response 
measures to the crisis, having been illustrated in the European Agenda on Migration – one of the 
main documents of EU institutions on post-2015 migration management.  
 
Despite the apparent decrease of arrivals into Europe after 2016, the topic if migration still 
remains as one of the main priorities within the EU and has become both a point of unity among 
Member States in the handling of the crisis, as well as a point of disagreement. In its task to 
provide solutions to this crisis, the EU needed collective solutions and unified actions, which can 
be illustrated in its common migration policy initiatives. But the situation evidently produced 
more than just common policies – it may have also led to the construction of a security rhetoric 
around the issue of migration. Thus, the present research attempts to reveal whether migration in 
the EU has indeed been framed as a security issue and whether this is reflected through the 
immigration policies of EU institutions. Furthermore, the ethical perspective of such a security 
rhetoric is also considered and the subsequent policies are examined through the lens of human 
rights. 
 
This paper set out the following aim: to reveal whether the official immigration policies of the 
EU have been securitised and if they correspond with EU values and human rights obligations. 
In order to achieve this aim, several objectives were also set out. The first one previewed an 
analysis of the outcome of the European 2015-16 migrant crisis through the lens of securitisation 
theory. For this purpose, both the theoretical basis of securitisation theory and securitisation of 
migration were laid out in Chapter 1, in order to provide the theoretical framework for the study. 
At this stage, it was showcased how securitisation theory can be applied to the case of migration, 
including the European migrant crisis. Next, in Chapter 2, a comprehensive background of the 
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2015-16 migrant crisis was also provided, in order to offer the necessary context and information 
on the events under analysis. The results of this part of the study indicated that the migrant crisis 
was largely a consequence of the events known as the Arab Spring, but it was also already years 
in the making. However, despite Europe’s broad history of immigration, the EU was unprepared 
for the major influx of migrants and refugees in 2015 and 2016, due to the absence of an 
effective common immigration and asylum policy. Consequently, as the research showed, the 
three new main policy areas in the immigration sphere were decided in a state of urgency and 
implemented with varying levels of success. Nonetheless, it was also seen that the EU still 
remains committed to these policy areas and they continue to be applied and reinforced 
nowadays – indicating the lasting relevance of the immigration issue in European politics. 
 
The next objective included the application of quantitative and qualitative analysis tools in order 
to conduct content and discourse analysis centred around EU immigration policies. The three 
policy areas examined in Chapter 2 were selected for this research – based on their importance 
and prevalence in EU’s migration management strategy: the relocation and resettlement scheme 
– also known as the Quota system; the agreement between EU and Turkey on refugee exchange; 
the role of the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex). For this purpose, 50 official 
documents of the EU were selected for each of the policy areas – 150 documents in total. These 
document packages were then analysed through the application of the automated text analysis 
software MEH (Meaning Extraction Helper). More specifically, the software run an automated 
check of the provided documents against a predetermined “security lexicon” composed by Baele 
and Sterck in their 2014 research on securitisation of migration in the EU (this lexicon can be 
found in the Appendix). The resulting amount of “security words” was then divided by the total 
amount of words in each document sample, thus giving us the “security ratio” for each policy. 
This ratio was then compared with the “low” and “high” security sample ratios provided by 
Baele and Sterck. The results of this analysis conducted in Chapter 3 indicated increased security 
ratios for all three examined policies: 3,04 for The Quota system, 2,84 for the EU-Turkey deal, 
and 3,37 for Frontex. Compared with the “low” security sample ratio of 1,26 – which is 
representative of generic EU policies not focused on hard security issues, these numbers 
indicated increased levels of security language and the presence of an intended securitising 
move, due to the repetitive occurrence of security-related words in the documents.  
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This quantitative content analysis was backed by a subsequent discourse analysis – the 
conveying of the security messages within EU immigration policy documents was analysed with 
examples from the reviewed text samples, in order to provide legitimacy and context for the 
quantitative analysis. This part of the research also indicated the presence of intended 
securitising moves, as it depicted repeated conveying of security messages in the texts. 
According to Baele and Sterck, securitisation is considered as a “continuum”, rather than as a 
single act and a simple yes/no logic would be insufficient in answering the question whether 
migration in the EU has been securitised. Rather, the research should provide a “measure of the 
intensity of security narratives”.210 Thus, the analysis conducted in Chapter 3 set out to provide 
levels of “intensity” of securitisation in the three main policies which were chosen for the 





Figure 9 – Summary of research results 
 
 
Such a combination of quantitative and qualitative methodology in the application of 
securitisation theory has been encountered in only a few previous works on the EU migrant 
 
210 Baele, S. J. Sterck, O. C. Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A New Method for 
Stronger Empirical Claims / S. J. Baele, O. C. Sterck // Political Studies. – 2014. Vol. 63, №. 5. – P. 1127. 
 86 
crisis, with Baele and Sterck’s 2014 paper being the first to champion such a method for the 
analysis of securitisation of migration. The novelty of this methodology stands in the unbiased 
sampling and analysis of data that includes both discourse and policies centred around migration, 
which allows to measure the intensity of security language. But as numbers require context – 
most importantly in the application of securitisation theory, which assigns major importance to 
language and construction of meaning, this analytical tool requires complementary qualitative 
discourse analysis. Thus, the present paper implements both methods, in order to provide 
sufficient evaluation and evidence of securitising moves.  
 
Given the combined research results demonstrated above, all three policies under examination 
presented increased security ratios and therefore high intensity of securitisation – affirming the 
presence of securitisation of migration in the EU. Thus, the findings of this part of the research 
show that the EU institutions’ immigration policies have indeed been securitised and the 
securitisation of migration in the EU after the 2015-16 migrant crisis can be confirmed.  
 
The next objective included examining the relation between the discourse and official 
immigration policies within the EU. This was achieved through the inclusion of texts that 
represented the discourse and actual policy documents of EU institutions, thus implementing the 
analysis of both areas in the research. More specifically, the 150 documents analysed with the 
MEH software in Chapter 3 included speeches and quotes of EU officials, press releases, as well 
as official legal documents of the EU, which referred to specific immigration policies. 
Additional commentary of academics was included to provide reinforcement for the validity of 
the analysis. This approach supplements previous critiques directed at securitisation theory for 
its focus on discourse and limited consideration of policies, as well as the role of institutions in 
their implementation. 
 
It was discovered through this part of the research that the EU has not set out to directly frame 
migrants as a “threat”, but it still resorted to extraordinary measures in handling the 2015-16 
migrant crisis and asserted the need to protect itself through the exclusion of others – the 
“outsiders”. This evidently goes in line with typical securitisation practices – as indicated by 
Huysmans, who references the political myth of the EU as a “homogenous national community 
or western civilisation,” that “existed in the past and can be re-established today through the 
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exclusion of those migrants who are identified as cultural aliens”.211 Subsequently, it was 
established in this part of the study that there is significant connection between the discourse and 
policy areas of immigration in the EU. 
 
The last objective focused on evaluating the correspondence of EU human rights obligations and 
its immigration policies. As seen in the last part of Chapter 3, while the EU has signed many 
international agreements on human rights and humanitarianism remains an important dimension 
of its decision-making processes, its immigration policies reflect a difficult balance between 
protecting its own security and protecting the well-being of migrants. Furthermore, as supported 
by Buonfino, it can be suggested that in the case of migration in the EU, the securitising moves 
go in parallel with the humanitarian rhetoric, because human rights represent one of the main 
European values.212 Indeed, the mention of humanitarianism is present in all the main EU 
immigration policies, but nonetheless their implementation has been criticised by many 
academics and human rights organisations. These criticisms reflect a dual reality, where the EU 
attempts to prioritise both security and humanitarianism, but struggles to balance its commitment 
to both. As a result, the EU’s immigration policy indicates flawed implementation and results, 
with measures being characterised by inflexibility, delays and high costs. This creates a situation 
where the EU seemingly fails in both the security and humanitarian aspect of its immigration 
policy directives – as illegal immigration to Europe does not cease to exist in significant 
numbers and access to asylum procedures and provision of migrants’ safety remain insufficient. 
As it was seen in this part of the research, the EU human rights obligations appear to correspond 
with its immigration policy in writing – though security themes still overtake human rights 
themes. But this correspondence is not present in practice – as evidenced by the examined 
criticism of the international community. 
 
To conclude, this research paper found that the official immigration policies of the EU have been 
securitised and their correspondence with the EU’s human rights values and obligations – while 
present on paper, is limited in application. Overall, the migrant crisis has shown that the EU 
faces a serious deficit in structures and institutions necessary to face such a situation with proper 
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competence. Integrated structures, legalised institutions and, above all, clear planning and 
political will seemed to constitute the main requirements in the successful facing of the crisis, 
but even the funds which the EU offered with generosity seemed to have been implemented with 
dubious effectiveness. Still, as evidenced by critiques of academics and human rights 
organisations, the EU tends to prioritise security over humanitarianism. Reports of human rights 
violations because of – or despite – the EU’s immigration policies, remain a frequent 
phenomenon, with the most recent depictions of the living conditions in Greek refugee camps 
described with words such as “hell”, “prison-like”, “appalling” – all of which the EU is aware of, 
yet the assistance to Greece has not been sufficient enough to improve the situation. 
 
Undoubtedly, the absence of a comprehensive collective EU-level immigration and asylum 
policy significantly restricts the EU’s capability to ensure human rights protections, as well as 
manage the consequences of the migrant crisis. But the issues of security and humanitarianism 
are deeply intertwined within the European discourse – especially when it comes to migration. 
Thus, the effectiveness of the EU’s immigration policy in the long run needs to be capable of 
balancing both aspects of the problem, as only the proper consideration of the human rights 
dimension can provide policies that are not disadvantageous to the very individuals that 
represent potential resource for a Europe with an aging population and economic struggles. De-
securitisation and the de-escalation of the security rhetoric represents a suitable way to re-install 
the balance between effectiveness and ethics in European migration management. A positive 
step towards this direction could be reforms and improvements to the existing EU legal 
framework on asylum, as well as the Dublin Regulation, in order to improve responsibility 
distribution for processing of asylum claims, thus making the process faster and more accessible 
to refugees and asylum seekers – the primary persons whose protection must be guaranteed by 
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kill*, Kurd*, Landmine, Law*, Lebanon, Liberat*, Libya, Malacca, Militar*, Missile, 
Munition*, Muslims, Nagasaki, Narcotics, Nationalis*, NATO, Nazi, Netwar, Nonproliferation, 
Korea, Nuclear, Offensive, Oil, OSCE, Overwhelm*, Pakistan, Palestine, Partisan, Police, 
Poverty, Power, Preempt*, Proliferat*, Protect*, Puniti*, Racis*, Radical*, Rescue, Resist*, 
Resolution, Resources, Response, Retaliation, Revenger, Revolution, Rival*, Rogue, Safe, 
SALT, SALW, Sanction*, Sarin, Scarc*, Seapower, Secur*, Seperatis*, Shock, Shortage*, 
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Surveillance, Syria, Tactic*, Target, Terror*, Threat, Traffic*, Transnational, Uprising, Values, 
Vietnam, Violen*, Water, Weapon, WMD, Wound*. 
 
* includes all forms of the word with identical lexical basis and meaning (e.g. “attack*” includes 
“attack”, “attacking”, “attacker”, etc.) 
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The security lexicon used for this research is the same as the one produced by Stéphane J. Baele 
and Olivier Sterck in their 2014 work “Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU 
Level: A New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims”. They based the lexicon on two reference 
glossaries: the UN Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies and the 
Palgrave Handbook on Security Studies, slightly modifying it to fit their research on immigration 
in the EU.  
  
